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PREFACE 
As an inexperienced articled clerk I was once consulted by a young 
widow who had two tiny children with her. She had lost her job and 
was wanting to know what her rights were. I had never studied any 
1 abour 1 aw but I had a vague idea that she was entitled to only 
notice pay. This was the terrible advice she ended up getting and 
it was only some months later that I realised my error. 
I had not yet been introduced to the wondrous concept of fairness in 
law. Nor was I aware of the wonderful remedy of reinstatement which 
could have returned to this person not only her dignity and her 
self-esteem, but also the means, in a country wracked by 
unemployment, of fending off complete poverty. 
Psychologists have shown that losing a job is one of the most 
distressing events in life. How much more distressing that loss 
must be when the dismissal is not fair and how much more 
devastating, when there is little prospect of finding other 
employment? This thesis is for all those people who have been 
unfairly dismissed and who, but for bad advice, might have been 
placed back in their jobs. It is hoped that it will contribute to 
the knowledge in this vitally important area of law and so help 
prevent the giving of unnecessarily bad advice. 
I wish to thank my initial supervisor Mr Julian Riekert, 
particularly for his support in the early stages of my research and 
generally for sharing his wonderful insight into labour law in this 
country. I al so wish to thank Dr John Hl ophe who has been my 
supervisor for the last eighteen months. During that period he has 
given me invaluable advice and guidance, often at times which have 
not been convenient to him at all. 
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My thanks, too, to my two seniors at work, Mr Trevor Mann and Mr 
Bruce Robertson, who have assisted me a great deal in many ways. 
Furthermore, I wish to thank Mrs Priscilla Govender who often 
achieved the impossible by transforming the scrawl of my manuscript 
into wonderfully accurate print, and always without any apparent 
trace of exasperation. 
I wish to thank my parents without whom I might never have had the 
opportunity of doing research at this level. Special thanks go to 
my wife Hillary for the initial inspiration which prompted me to 
begin this thesis and for her continued and consistent support and 
encouragement through some very bleak periods. And lastly, my 
apologies rather than thanks to my dear daughter Kathryn for the 
many precious hours we could otherwise have spent together. 
I confirm that this whole thesis, except where it is otherwise 
specifically indicated, is my own original work. 
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- l -INTRODUCTION 
For those of us in this country fortunate enough to be employed, the 
security which comes with having a job is extremely important. For 
those to whom it is in many cases not only the sole form of security 
but also the very means of survival, it is invaluable. In a country 
like South Africa which has such massive employment, one would think 
that the importance of job security would have been easily 
recognised at an early stage. But it was not and only fairly 
recently have serious attempts been made to incorporate the right 
into our law. 
It has been found that a good way of ensuring an appreciation of the 
value of job security is to stipulate that the decision to terminate 
the employment relationship should never be arbitrary or 
unjustified. The termination should, in other words, always be fair 
and where it is not, there should be a means of reversing it where 
necessary. In the past ten years, the Legislature has attempted to 
give effect to this method of protecting job security.1 Basically 
it has done so by introducing the concept of fairness and by 
establishing an overseer in the form of the Industrial Court which 
it has given the power to order reinstatement. 
1. The protection is unfortunately not enjoyed by all employees,
the most important exclusions being those employed in farming
operations or in domestic service in private households, those
employed by the State and those who teach in universities,
technikons and in most schools (in terms of S2 (2) of the
Labour Relations Act No. 28 of 1956).
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This thesis will consider how effective the law has been in respect 
of individual dismissals. In order to do this, it will be necessary 
to emphasise the deficiencies of the colllllon law by looking at the 
position in South Africa before the concept of unfair dismissal, 
both abroad and in this country, as well as the origin of the 
doctrine of fairness will then be briefly considered. This will 
lead on to an in-depth study of the requirements of procedural 
fairness as determined by the Industrial Court and this will be 
followed by a look at what, in the view of the court, constitutes 
substantive fairness in its many different forms. The thesis 
concludes with a study of the essential remedy of reinstatement, 
tracing its history and the reasons why it was initially rejected to 
the stage where it is undoubtedly a valid and accepted remedy. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE THE STATUTORY INTRODUCTION OF 
THE CONCEPT OF AN UNFAIR DISMISSAL 
The belief on which our early law was based was that every 
employment contract was entered into voluntarily and either party 
was similarly free to end it at any time provided they gave 
sufficient notice1 and provided there was no contractual provision
to the contrary. Even if there was a contrary provision, all the 
employer was faced with was a claim for damages which would be the 
sum the employee would have earned had the contract been 1 awfully 
terminated. In a fixed-term contract this would generally be the 
equivalent of the payment still due under the contract. Where the 
contract was not for a fixed-term the sum would be equivalent to the 
notice period which, in the case of monthly paid employees would be 
a month and, in respect of weekly paid employees, a week. 
Employer and employee were seen as having equal bargaining powers, 
each having the respective right to choose whom they wished to work 
for them and whom they wished to work for. What was not taken into 
account was that the choice each had was in fact very different. 
While the employer usually had a large reservoir of unemployed to 
choose from, the employee, in competing with his unemployed 
counterparts, was usually satisfied with any job he could get. This 
was particularly true of the unskilled employee. 
1. This provision was not peremptory and an employer could get rid
of an employee immediately as long as he was paid in lieu of
notice. Neither party had to give any reason, or indeed had to
have any reason, for ending the contract. The possibility of
an employee having any right to claim reinstatement would have
been out of the question.
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While both parties were believed to have had an equality of rights, 
it was only when one looked at the effects of that exercise of 
'equal I rights that one realized how unequal they really were. When 
the employee exercised his right to end the contract, which seldom 
occurred, the detrimental effect on the employer would generally 
have been slight. In most cases, the employee would easily and 
quickly have been replaced. When the employer, on the other hand, 
exercised his right to end the contract, the effect on the employee 
would generally have been disastrous, especially in times of 
widespread unemployment, when the employee's 'equal I right to choose 
whom he wished to work for would be diminished, and in most cases 
non-existent. In South Africa, this inequality was increased by the 
fact that many workers, once they were dismissed, lost their rights 
to reside in the areas where they were most likely to find other 
jobs2 •
2. In terms of s 10 (1) (d) of the now repealed Black (Urban Areas
Consolidation) Act 25 of 1945. Many employers, once dismissals
had to be justified, took advantage of this loss of rights,
knowing that it would have been extremely difficult for a
dismissed worker to make a claim for reinstatement, once he had
been bussed back to his 'homeland'. See, for example, ROOIBERG
MINERALS DEVELOPMENT CO LTD v DU TOIT 1953 (2) S A  505 (T) and
NGEWU AND OTHERS v UNION CO-OPERATIVE BANK ANO SUGAR CO 1982
(4) SA 390 (N). For a discussion of the latter case, see N
Haysom 'Dismissal and the Eviction of Employees From Their 
Employers' Premises' (1981) 2 ILJ 259. 
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The common law further entitled an employer to dismiss an employee 
without notice if he was guilty of any material breaches of his 
contractual obligations. The following were most commonly seen as 
being material breaches of an employment contract: 
1. Refusal to work3;
2. Insubordination (in the form of insolence which usually
includes a refusal to perform work)4;
3. Gross negiligence or incompetence5;
3. Including a strike which entitled the employer to cancel the
contract summarily, see R V SMIT 1955 (1) SA 239 (C) and
MOONIAN v BALMORAL HOTEL 1925 NPD 215.
4. See, for example, OATEN v BENTWICH AND LICHTENSTEIN 1903 TH 118
where an emp 1 oyee 11• • • became i nso 1 ent and abusive in
defendant's shop, a public place, it became impossible for the
defendant to overlook his conduct • • • It (was) •••
impossible under circumstances like these for the relationship
of master and servant to continue". See, too, JAMIESON v
ELSWORTH 1915 AD 115 where Innes CJ said that the position of
an employee, 11 • • •  compared with that of his employer was
distinctly a subordinate one, so that the 1 atter was entitled
to expect from the former, not indeed subservience, but
ordinary courtesy and civility certainly. 11 Contrast with this
the case of OSCHE v HAUMMAN 1910 OFS 59.
5. See COWIE v ELLARD & CO (1894) 9 EDC 152, WALLACE v RAND DAILY
MAILS LTD 1917 AD 479; FRIEDLANDER v HODES BROS 1944 CPD 169;
NEGRO v CONTINENTAL KNITTING AND SPINNING MILLS (PTY) LTD 1954
( 2) SA 203 ( W).
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4. Repeated absence without good cause and constant tardiness;
5. Incapacity (in the form of illness)6;
6. Drunkenness7;
7. Sleeping on duty;
8. Dishonesty;8
The above breaches were to be seen in the light of the persistence 
of the misconduct, the harm suffered by the employer and the nature 
of the work, although there was no provision for any sort of enquiry 
to be held prior to the decision to dismiss. 
If an employee was dismissed without notice and without having been 
guilty of one of the abovementioned breaches, his di smi ssa 1 would 
have been wrongful. His remedy for this would have been to sue for 
6. BOYD v STUTTAFORD 1910 AD 101.
7. SCHNEIER AND LONDON LTD v BENNETT 1927 TPD 346.
8. See, MWU v BRODRICK 1948(4) SA 959(A); FEDERAL COLD STORAGE v
ANGHERN & PIEL 1910 TPD 1347; NOURSE v FARMERS' CO-OPERATIVE CO
LTD 19 EDC 291.
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damages, which damages he would have had to mitigate9 •
This limited remedy was all the employee had prior to the watershed 
decisions in the cases of STEWART WRIGHTSON (PTY) LTD v THORPElO
and NATIONAL UNION OF TEXTILE WORKERS AND OTHERS v STAG PACKINGS 
(PTY) LTD AND ANOTHER11 when the remedy of reinstatement or
specific performance in the employment contract was recognised12 •
There had also been very limited statutory protection against unfair 
dismissal. Chapter IV of The Public Service Act13 , for example,
contains procedures which have to be complied with before an 
employee can be dismissed for misconduct or poor work performance. 
Furthermore, the dismissal of an employee because of his trade union 
9. See C NORMAN-SCOBLE THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT IN SOUTH
AFRICA (BUTTERWORTHS, 1 956) 225; CUNNINGHAM v BROWN 1936 SR
175; KINEMAS LTD v BERMAN 1932 AD 246, SCHIERHOUT v MINISTER OF
JUSTICE 1926 AD 107; DE PINTO AND ANOTHER v RENSEA INVESTMENTS
(PTY) LTD 1977 (4) AD 529; BANCO DE PORTUGAL v WATERLOW & SONS
LTD 1932 AC 452; KUBHEKA AND ANOTHER v IMEXTRA (PTY) LTD 1975
( 4 ) SA 484 ( W ) •
10. 1977 (2) SA 943 (A)
11. 1982 (4) SA 151 (T)
12. See chapter 6 below.
13. No. 54 of 1957. See further M Brassey, E Cameron, H Cheadle
and M Olivier The New Labour Law (Juta & Co, 1987) 310
hereafter referred to as 'Brassey et al The New Labour Law.
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activities amounts to victimization and is a contravention of the 
provisions contained in numerous statutes aimed at curbing such 
practices.14 In effect, though, these provisions gave very little 
protection because compliance with the procedure was all that was 
required and victimization was usually difficult to prove. The 
negligible amounts awarded in claims for damages were also of little 
help to people who had lost their source of income which could have 
lasted a lifetime. 
The first glimmerings of the principles of unfair dismissal, 
however, emerged in South Africa as far back as 194815 • The
14. See for example, Section 18 of the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act No. 3 of 1983; Section 48 of the Manpower
Training Act No. 56 of 1981; Section 4 of the Black Transport
Services Act No. 53 of 1957; Section 66 of the Labour
Relations Act No. 28 of 1956 and Section 25 of the Wage Act No.
5 of 1957. While Section 18 of the Machinery and Occupational
Safety Act No. 6 of 1983 contains wording relating to the
commission of certain Acts which is similar to the wording
contained in the above-mentioned Acts, does not contain the
provision relating to Trade Union activities, possibly because
it is one of the only Acts which does not exclude farm workers
from the definition of 11employee 11 , and the Legislature would
have been loathe to extend such protection to them.
15. In the case of SOUTH AFRICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
v MINISTER OF LABOUR 1948 (1) SA 528 which concerned an
app 1 icati on brought under Section 35 of the Industrial
Conciliation Act No. 36 of 1937, in terms of which the court
had to decide whether or not a Conci 1 i ati on Boa rd should be
established to settle the dispute relating to a dismissal.
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employee in that case had been lawfully dismissed on the ground of 
superannuation, although his efficiency was unimpaired and although 
he had always rendered faithful service. The court held that the 
question was not whether the employer was entitled to terminate the 
employee I s services under the contract but it was whether, " •••• 
notwithstanding its legal right to do so, {which was never disputed) 
it should have done so, in view of the various circumstances of the 
case" •16 The court made the distinction between what was lawful
and what was right or fair and asked the question whether it was 
fair to superannuate an employee whose capabilities were not 
impaired by his age.17 
Six years later, the Cape Provincial Division 18 held that the
question which had to be resolved by the Conciliation Board was not 
whether the employer had acted within its legal rights but whether 
16. At 532
17. An argument put forward by counsel for the Minister illustrates
the level of thinking at that stage. He tried to argue that an
employee who had been dismissed was no longer an employee and
could consequently not benefit from the provisions of the Act.
The Court rejected the argument, relying on the case of CITY
COUNCIL OF CAPE TOWN v UNION GOVERNMENT 1931 CPD 366 which had
held that an employee who had been dismissed was still an
employee for the purposes of the Act.
18. In the case of GEORGE DIVISIONAL COUNCIL v MINISTER OF LABOUR
AND ANOTHER 1954 {3) SA 300 (C) AT 305 E.
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it had acted 'inequitably or unreasonably'. In another case, 19
the term "unfair" makes its first appearance. 2° Counsel acting 
for the employee complained that he had been "unfairly dismissed" 
and although he, 11 • • •  never contested the Council 1 s legal right to 
dismiss him, it was the unreasonableness of his dismissal to which 
he objected." 21 The distinction between lawfulness and fairness
was also made in the more recent case of FRANKFORT MUNISIPALITEIT v 
MINISTER VAN ARBEID EN 1 N ANDER 22 where the Court went so far as 
to enquire into why the employee had really been dismissed. 
The spectres of fairness and justification for dismissal were 
beginning to rise up, encroaching on what was once regarded as the 
prerogative of the employer.23
19. CAPE TOWN MUNICIPALITY v MINISTER OF LABOUR AND ANOTHER 1965
(4) SA 770 (C).
20. At 774.
21. At 774-5.
22. 1970 (2) SA 49 (0)
23. See further Brassey et al The New Labour Law 314 ff.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL ABROAD AND IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
The pri nci pl e that a worker should not lose Ms job without good 
reason had been present in the legislation of a few countries prior 
to 1963 when the International Labour Organisation I s Termination of 
Employment Recommendation No. 119 was adapted.1 But the
Recommendation ensured that the principle was almost universally 
accepted and enshrined in law and this Recommendation was such a 
success that certain countries such as Cambodia and Zaire requested 
the help of the Organization's technical experts to draft 
legislation for them2 • Furthermore, the Recommendation emphasised
the importance of job security and developed the thinking that there 
was no reason why security, one of the most fundamental of human 
needs, should not extend to the employment relationship. 
l. The Mexican Constitution of 1917, for example, provided that
11 The employer who dismisses a worker without just cause or for
having joined an association or trade union or for having taken
part in a legal strike shall be obliged, at the election of the
worker, to carry out the contract or compensate the worker in
the amount of three months 'wages' - article 123 (XXII) cited
in E Yemin 'Job Security: Influence of ILO Standards and
Recent Trends. 1 International Labour Review, Vol 113, No. l,
January - February 1976 at 20. Another early recognition of
the principle is found in the Russian SFSR Labour code adapted
in 1922 - also cited in Yemin at 20.
2. Yemin op cit at 21.
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Since job security could not be assured in all circumstances, the 
Recommendation provided that a worker's employment contract could 
not be terminated unless there was a valid reason for termination 
connected with the conduct or capacity of the worker, or based on 
the operational requirement of the enterprise.3 The employee's
right to work must be reconciled with the employer's right to 
operate and the Reconvnendation recognising that neither of these 
rights can be absolute, sensibly limits them by proposing that the 
employee should only be dismissed for a valid cause.4 It also
laid down certain reasons which would always be invalid reasons for 
dismissal.5 These were: trade union membership or activities,
lodging complaints against the employer in good faith about the 
breach of a legal obligation, race, sex, colour, marital status, 
religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin. 
The Recommendation also stated that workers who felt aggrieved by an 
unjustifiable dismissal be entitled to a right of appeal with the 
help of someone representing them.6 If the termination was found
to be unjustifiable, the body conducting the hearing should have the 
authority to order reinstatement together with the payment of lost 
wages or to order that the worker be paid adequate compensation.7
The Recommendation heralded the general application of the minimum 
standard that no worker should be dismissed in the absence of a 
valid or fair reason. Most countries in the world were to 
incorporate this into their law in some way or another. 
3. In terms of paragraph 2 ( l ) •
4. See, further, T Pool man Pri nci p 1 es of Unfair Labour Practice
(Juta & Co, l985;Y AT 155 - 156.
5. In terms of paragraph 3.
6. In terms of paragraph 4.
7. In terms of paragraph 6.
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The term 'unfair dismissal I is used only in Britain and while it is 
used freely by our Industrial Court, the term was not found in our 
legislation prior to the Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 83 of 
1988. The French talk of 11abusive 11 dismissal, West Germans of 
"socially unwarranted" dismissals and Italians of dismissals without 
"justified motive" 8•
As has been seen, the common law approach in South Africa had begun 
to 1 ose substance before 1979. 9 However it was not unti 1 1979, 
when the Government accepted the recommendations of the Report of 
the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation, now better known 
as the Wiehahn Commission, that the way was paved for the statutory 
introduction of the concept. 
While South Africa had withdrawn from the International Labour 
Organisation in 1964, the Wiehahn Commission suggested that the 
country should attempt to use international recommendations, such as 
Reconnnendation No. 119 of 1963, as yardsticks for its own labour 
legislation. As a result of the proposals contained in the Report, 
legislation introducing the concept of an 'unfair labour practice' 
was promulgated in 1979.10
8. J 8 Cronin and RP Grime Labour Law {Butterworths, 1970) AT 129
p.p.
9. See the discussion above on the recognition of the pri nci pl es
of fairness in the early cases.
10. The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act No. 94 of 1979.
While there was no specific reference in the Legislation to the
concept of unfair dismissal, it was soon accepted that the
definition of an unfair labour practice was wide enough to
include it. Only in 1988 was express provision for unfair
dismissal included in the Legislation.
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With the concept of an unfair labour practice being new to South 
African law, and since unfair dismissals were not then strictly 
regulated by statute as they are, for instance, in Britain, our 
Industrial Court has often been guided by the development of the 
concept in that country 11 and in the United States of America 12
as well as being guided by international standards of industrial 
relations. 
11. The concept of "unfair industrial practice" contained in the
Industrial Relations Act of 1971 fell away in 1974 with the
introduction of the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act, but
the sections dealing specifically with unfair dismissal, which
had proved to be successful, were retained in the new Act.
Although see : DB Ehlers - 'Dispute Settling and Unfair Labour
Practices: The Role of the Industrial Court vis-a-vis the
Industrial Council (1982) 3 ILJ 11 where he claims that the
expression 'unfair labour practice' cannot borrow from the
labour law of Britain where, 11 • • • •  legislation exists dealing
with the concept of 'unfair dismissals' which is then
statutorily defined. That definition can probably be said to
accentuate the dismissal aspect11 (AT 13).
12. The term 'Unfair Labour Practice' has its origins in the
legislation of the United States where the National Labour
Relations Act of 1935, as amended by the Labour Management
Rel at ions Act of 1947 (generally referred to as the
Taft-Hartley Act) defined and introduced remedies for unfair
labour practices. See A Reichman and E Mureinik, 'Unfair
Labour Practices' 1980 (1) ILJ 1 and T Poolman Principles of
Unfair Labour Practice (Juta & Co, 1985) AT 128 p.p.
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The concept was initially introduced by the use of the widest 
definition imaginable. An unfair labour practice meant 11 • • • •  any 
labour practice which in the opinion of the industrial court is an 
unfair labour practice 11 •13 This definition was soon amended14
and was replaced by the definition which lasted from 1980 until 
1988. The 1980 Amending Act defined an Unfair Labour Practice as: 
'a) any labour practice or any change in any labour practice, other 
than a strike or a lockout or any action contemplated in 
s 66(1 ), which has or may have the. effect that 
i) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly
affected or that his or their employment opportunities,
work security or physical, economic, moral or social
welfare is or may be prejudiced or jeopardized thereby;
ii) the business of any employer or class of employers is or
may be unfairly affected or disrupted thereby;
iii) labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby;
iv) the relationship between employer and employee is or may
be detrimentally affected thereby; or
13. In terms of an amendment to sl of the then Industrial
Conciliation Act No. 28 of 1956, contained in the Industrial
Conciliation Amendment Act No. 94 of 1979.
14. By the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act No. 95 of 1980.
As Mureinik wrote in 1980 "Plainly, this definition is open
texture in the extreme, and its content depends very 1 argely
upon the manner of its interpretation 11 • E Mureinik 11 Unfair
Labour Practices: Update' (1980) l ILJ 113.
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b) any other labour practice or any other change in any labour
practice which has or may have an effect which is similar or
related to any effect mentioned in paragraph (a) 1 • 
The definition, though more restricted, was still fairly wide and 
the Industrial Court continued to have virtual carte blanche to 
decide what it believed were fair or unfair labour practices and the 
court appreciated this. In UAMAWU & OTHERS v FODENs,15 for 
example, EHLERS DP 16 believed,
........ it would appear that the legislature by defining the 
concept in such wide terms could have intended that this court 
should lay down guidelines17 as to what are to be considered
unfair labour practices ... 18 
In fashioning those guidelines the court was fairly creative and it 
took various factors into account in determining the fairness or 
otherwise of a dismissal. These have included the stipulations 
l 5. (l 983) 4 I LJ 21 2.
1 6 . As he then was. 
17. The doctrine of 1 stare decisis 1 is not applied in the court and
for good reason. Industrial relations is, after all, a rapidly
changing and dynamic field and this makes it essential for
there to be a degree of flexibility in the law.
18. AT 224 F-G.
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contained in contracts of employment, 19 the provisions contained 
in recognition agreements and disciplinary procedures and codes, 
factory rules or customs, and the provisions contained in various 
other statutes 20 and in industrial council agreements. 21 
The 1980 Unfair Labour Practice definition, but for an amendment in 
198222 which removed the provision excluding victimization from
the definition, lasted until 1st September 1988. It was then 
drastically amended23 amidst much controversy and despite some
very valid criticism by labour who saw it as an attempt to take away 
many of the rights which the court had laid down over the years. 
19. See, for example, MWASA & OTHERS v THE ARGUS PRINTING AND
PUBLISHING CO. LTD (1984) 5 ILJ 16 at 26 - 27 I.
20. See in this regard, MATSHOBA & OTHERS v FRY'S METALS (PTY) LTD
(1983) 4 ILJ 107 at 118D - 119C and 121H - 122A where the
provisions relating to overtime in the Factories Machinery and
Bui 1 ding Works Act were held to outweigh any contrary
provisions in the employment contract. The provisions relating
to victimization in various other statutes would also be of
relevance.
21. See, for example, MAWU v STOBAR REINFORCING (PTY) LTD (1983) 4
ILJ 84.
22. Introduced by s 1 of the Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 51
of 1982.
23. By s 1 of the Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 83 of 1988.
Act No. 51 of 1982.
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The definition, in attempting to codify the concept of an unfair 
1 abour practice, now spans some three pages in the Act24 and for
the first time attempts specifically to regulate unfair dismissal. 
It has unfortunately been very poorly drafted, leaving many of its 
intentions unclear and many of those which are clear are 
ill-conceived. The attempted codification of an unfair dismissal, 
far from making matters more simple, will provide much ensuing 
1 iti gati on and though it wi l1 undoubtedly prove to be the dream of 
many practising lawyers, it will almost as certainly be a nightmare 
for the court's presiding officers.25 The consideration of the
contents and effect of the definition on the law of unfair 
dismissal, which is made below, leave little doubt that it is a 
'tortuous 126 definition.
24. Because the defi ni ti on is too 1 engthy to reproduce here, it is
contained in Appendix I.
25. It is not surprising that the President of the court, Dr
Ehlers, has been requested to retire early, particularly in
view of his expressed preference for the unrestricting terms of
the old definition.
26 . The term is Clive Thompson's, quoted in Business Day 19 
September 1989. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DOCTRINE OF FAIRNESS
The aforegoing discussion necessitates an analysis of the 
development of 'fairness' as a doctrine and, in particular, its 
relation to the dismissal of employees. As has been said,1
concentration, 11 • • • •  on the words 'unfair' and 'unfairly' •••• could 
be said to be of critical importance •••••• in the determination of 
an unfair labour practice 11 , 2 and consequently an unfair
dismissal. In order to consider the source of the doctrine, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the 'procedure' and the 'substance' 
of fairness. 
The procedure of fairness, or procedural fairness, has its basis in 
the principles of natural justice. While natural �ustice is 
sometimes seen as embodying the I fundamental pri nci p 1 es of 
fairness' ,3 this is only correct insofar as it refers to
procedural fairness. 
1. D B Ehlers "Dispute Settling and Unfair Labour Practices: The
Role of the Industrial Court vis-a-vis the Industrial Council 11
(1982) 3 ILJ 11.
2. At 13.
3. See, for example, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR v BECHLER 1948 (3)
SA 409 (A) AT 451 and JOCKEY CLUB OF SOUTH AFRICA v FELDMAN
1942 AD 340 AT 351 and see L Baxter Administrative Law (Juta &
Co, l 984) 540.
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There is an on-going debate in English law that fairness, at least 
in the context of Administrative Law, should not have a substantive 
meaning. 4 The reason why it should not, it is argued, is that 
1 fairness 1 would then be confused with 'reasonableness 1 •5 While 
there is generally no harm in giving 1 fairness 1 a substantive 
context in Labour Law, and this is certainly always done, there have 
been occasions when the Industrial Court has indeed fallen into the 
trap of equating reasonableness with fairness. 6 In doing so, they 
have relied on the English law of unfair dismissal where the test of 
reasonableness is stipulated in the governing legislation. 7 The 
tests are of course very different.8
4. See SA De Smith 1 s Judicial Review of Administrative Action
(London) Stevens 4th Edition by J.M. Evans (1980) 346; P.P.
Craig 'Administrative Law• London (Sweet and Maxwell, 1983) 360.
5. See, L Baxter Administrative Law (Juta & Co, 1984) 596.
6. See, for example, LEFU & OTHERS v WESTERN AREAS GOLD MINING CO.
LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 307 AT 314C - F; ROBBERTZE v MATTHEW
RUSTENBURG REFINERIES (WADEVILLE) (1986) 7 ILJ 64 AT 70 D - E;
NUM v EAST RAND GOLD & URANIUM CO. (1986) 7 ILJ 739 and NUWSAW
v DISTILLERS CORP (1987} 8 ILJ 780. See, too, Brassey et al
The New Labour Law 71-4
7. Initially, in terms of paragraph 6(8) of Schedule I to the
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974 and now in terms
of section 57 (3) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation)
Act of 1978.
8. By means of the 1988 Amendments to the Labour Relations Act, in
paragraph (a) of the definition of an unfair labour practice,
the legislature has again endorsed its preference for the test
of fairness. See E CAMERON, H CHEADLE AND C THOMPSON THE NEW
LABOUR RELATIONS ACT (JUTA & CO, 1989) 109.
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What then are the principles of Natural Justice? They are expressed 
by the maxims 'AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM' and 'NEMO IUDEX IN PROPRIA 
CAUSA I and they mean respectively that the other side should be 
heard and that no one should be a judge in his own cause. 
The importance of hearing the other side has been seen as having 
beginnings which can be traced back to the Bib l e9 and its value
was recognised in Egypt as early as 2300 Bc.10 Both principles 
a re a 1 so found in Roman Law with the Twelve Tab 1 es laying down the 
death penalty for any judge influenced by bribes11 and the
9. See, for example, the book of John, chapter VII verse 51:
11According to our law we cannot condemn a man before hearing
him and finding out what he has done. The English judge,
Fortescue, put it quaintly when he said 11 • • •  even God himself
did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to
make his defence II in R v CHANCELLOR OF THE UN I VERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE {1723) I STR 557 AT 567 : See S A  de Smith Judicial
Review of Administrative Action {London} Stevens 4th Edition by
J M Evans (1980) AT 158 n 33.
10. The cathartic benefit of a hearing is emphasised in the
following excerpt from the instruction of Ptahhotep in the 6th
Dynasty which lasted from 2300 to 2150BC:
'If you are a man who leads, listen calmly to the speech of one 
who pleads; Don't stop him from purging his body of that which 
he planned to tell. A man in distress wants to pour out his 
heart more than that his case be won. About him who stops a 
plea one says : "why does he reject it?" Not all one pleads 
for can be granted, but a good hearing soothes the heart.' See 
Lictheim 'Ancient Egyptian Literature' Vol 1 (1973} 61 AT 68 
quoted by Baxter in Administrative Law at 539. 
11. In terms of paragraph 9.3. 
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importance of a hearing being expressed in Seneca's Media.12 Both
principles were also important in Roman Dutch Law13 in which we
find one of the earliest applications of the principle of 'audi 
alteram partem' to the termination of the employment contract. 
Prior to their dismissal on grounds of misconduct, judicial officers 
were entitled to a hearing.14
With such prevalence throughout the Ages and all over the world it 
is not surprising to find the basis of both principles present in 
the text of the Internati ona 1 Labour Organisation's Termination of 
Employment Reco11111endation No. 119 which reads: 
11A worker who feels that his employment has been unjustifiably 
terminated should be entitled, unless the matter has been 
satisfactorily determined through such procedures within the 
12. At lines 199 to 220 : "Qui statuit aliquid, parte inaudita
altera, aequum, licet statuerit, haud aeques fuerit,"
translated as he who has come to a finding without hearing the
other party has not been just even though his finding may have
been just. 1 - see De Smith Ibid at 158.
13. See VOET 2.1.50 : 'It is entirely unjust to bestow on any
person the freedom to give judgement in an affair of his own'
and 51 and 2.4. l which expressed the importance of the 'audi
alteram partem' principle (see L Baxter Administrative Law
(Juta & Co, 1984) 537 n 13).
14. HUBER 4.14.60. (see Baxter, Ibid).
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undertaking •••• to appeal, within a reasonable time, against 
that termination •••• to a body established under a collective 
agreement or to a neutral body such as a court, an arbitrator, 
an arbitration committee or a similar body. 11 15
So much then for procedural fairness which is, after al 1, only a 
pre-requisite to the more important element of substantive 
fairness. This lies at the centre of fairness and is generally best 
reached by way of the path of procedure. 
What then of its origins? 
fairness is that time-honoured 
would agree should be upheld. 
Though intangible and indefinite, 
and universal value which everyone 
Because of its close links with 
morality, it is probably true to say the notion of fairness has 
existed since man first developed a sense of the rightness or 
blameworthiness of his own behaviour or, more simply, since he 
developed a conscience. Its value is certainly revered in the 
teachings of the Bible and it could be said to be the basis, in one 
way or another, of a 11 religions. The concept has been considered 
and discussed since the Greek philosophers in the fifth century B.C. 
began grappling with ideas of social control 16 and it has
continued to puzzle both philosophers and jurists ever since. 
15. At paragraph 4. See, too, paragraph 11 (5) which reads .. Before
a decision to dismiss a worker for serious misconduct becomes
finally effective, the worker should be given an opportunity to
state his case promptly ....... . 
16. See R Pound Justice According to Law (Yale U.P., 1952) AT 2.
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It is, not surprisingly, extremely difficult to define. 11Like 
defining an elephant, 
practice has the 
recognise. 1117 If one
it is not easy to do, although fairness in 
elephantine quality of being easy to 
were to attempt to define the concept, one 
would find that the terms 1 fairness 1 , 1 justice 1 and 1 equity 1 are 
often used interchangeably and are generally defined in dictionaries 
in terms of each other.18 Thus, we find them described as
implying an objectivity which manages to achieve a 'proper balance 
of conflicting rights.•19 The tenns consequently also imply a
compromising or a massaging of those rights into a form which 
satisfies the conflicting parties. 
Rights are very seldom evenly weighted and when they are created by 
or put into the form of laws, there is almost always an imbalance 
since made as they are by the ruling or stronger party, the benefits 
are naturally weighted in his favour. Laws are, in addition, by 
their very nature rigid and as a result their application tends to 
be problematical. What, it was realised at an early stage,20 was
17. Per Lawton L J in MAXWELL v DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
(1974) 2 ALL ER 122 (CA) AT 131.
18. See L Baxter 'Fairness and Natural Justice in English and South
African Administrative Law (1979) SALJ 607 AT 633.
19. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (G & C Merriam Co, 1974).
20. See, for example, Aristotle's discussion of equity in his
'Nicomachean Ethics' Book Five, Chapter Ten (in J.A.K.
Thompson's translation The Ethics of Aristotle (Harmondsworth :
Penguin, 1955) p.p. 166-7) cited by D Jackson in 'Unfair
Dismissals: How and why the law works' (Cambridge UP, 1975) 19.
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necessary was some means of establishing the balance and at the same 
time adapting the inflexibility of laws to accommodate the vagaries 
of everyday life. Equity and fairness provided such a means. Their 
very indefiniteness and abstractness was ideal. 
The English system of Equity, for example, managed to satisfy both 
these needs. Ori gi nati ng in the courts of Chancery, doctrines of 
equity assisted in making the narrow common 
practicable. Where the common law was 
doctrines were fonnulated to override it. 21 
law more workable and 
totally inapplicable, 
One of the distinguishing features of fairness and equity is that 
they require a consideration of all the particular circumstances of 
each different case whereas the law, generally speaking, cannot do 
so. It can only have regard to the rights of the parties, which 
rights it usually sees as being inflexible. The law's relative 
rigidity in a rapidly changing field such as industrial relations 
was clearly undesirable22 and the value of fairness, which could
21. See HR Hahlo AND E Kahn THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEG AL SYSTEM AND ITS
BACKGROUND (Juta & Co, 1973) 135.
22. It was indeed a concern expressed by a committee of the
National Joint Advisory Council in Engl and that the law would
be too rigid to control industrial relations. See D Jackson
'Unfair Dismissals' : How and why the law works (Cambridge UP,
1975) 8. See the interesting discussion on why the English law
specifically chose the term 'unfair' instead of 'unjust' or
'unreasonable' in Jackson Ibid AT 77 - 80.
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far more easily adapt to the mores and demands of the day, was 
obvious. Its malleability in adapting to surrounding environments 
was essential and its readily compromising nature was perfectly 
suited to the built-in inequality of the employment relationship. 
While the inherent flexibility and indefiniteness of the concept is 
so useful, it can also cause problems in practice because it enables 
so many different views of what is fair in any given situation. 23
But however varied the range of interpretations may be of what 
constitutes fairness, there are certain consistent principles or 
cri teri a24 which ensure at 1 east a semblance of consensus about
fairness in the relatively restricted field of dismissal. 
23. See the distinction between a concept and its conceptions which
Ronald Dworkin illustrates so well in his book Taking Rights
Seriously (Duckworth, 1978) AT 134-5 cited by Baxter
Administrative Law (Juta & Co, 1984 ) AT 484 n 39.
24. These will be considered in chapter 5 below. See generally
T Poelman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice (Juta & Co,
l 984) 42 - 61 •
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CHAPTER 4 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT 
In order to justify a dismissal one must have a good reason for 
terminating the contract, and the best way of establishing such a 
reason is by having a fair procedure. The need for a procedure has 
developed into the requirement which is today simply referred to as 
"Procedural Fairness". The requirement is essential since, without 
it, the search for fairness could lapse into a system of "palm-tree" 
justice, with no guiding qualities of distinct rules. 
Up until recently, there was no statutory provision for procedural 
fairness.1 The Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 83 of 1988,
which came into effect on 1st September 1988, introduced for the 
first time the requirement that dismissals 1by reason of any 
di sci pl inary action• had to be preceded by a 'fair procedure'. 2
Where the termination is not as a result of the taking of any 
disciplinary action, the Act now requires that it complies with a 
retrenchment-like procedure.3 The precise meaning of the words 
1 by reason of any disciplinary action 1 is unclear but it is hoped 
that they will be interpreted broadly to encompass any dismissal 
which is carried out in order to uphold standards of discipline in 
1. We have seen that the entire law of unfair dismissal was based
on the broad 'unfair labour practice• definition.
2. In terms of paragraph (a) of the definition of an unfair labour
practice.
3. In terms of paragraph (b) of the definition.
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the workplace. Thus, where an employee is so ill that he cannot 
continue to work in his present job, he is 'disciplined' (even 
though no amount of disciplining will make him well again) by means 
of dismissal unless there is an alternative position for him. The 
same terminology could be applied to employees who are incompetent 
or incompatible and in this way paragraph (a) of the definition 
would cover all these forms of dismissal.4 
The definition gives little idea of what is to comprise a 'fair 
procedure' in the case of dismissals by reason of disciplinary 
acti on5 and it is hoped that the court wi 11 not deviate too far
from decisions made prior to the amendments. In dismissals on 
grounds other than disciplinary action, the Act does specify what 
constitutes a fair procedure and sets out basically the same 
requirements as those laid down by the court in cases dealing with 
retrenchment.6
4. See Cameron et al in The New Labour Rel at ions Act at l 08-1 O,
143-4 and 154 where the authors give the words a narrow
meaning, interpreting them to apply only to dismissals for 
misconduct. Dismissals for incapacity or incompatibility, they 
say, are to be dealt with in terms of paragraph (b) of the 
definition. Such an inappropriate procedure for these 
dismissals, it is submitted, could not have been intended. 
5. Other than making it clear (in terms of paragraph (a) (iv))
that any dismissal 'which takes pl ace after substantial
compliance with the terms and conditions of an agreement
relevant to the dismissal' would be fair.
6. In terms of paragraph (b) (ii). There is also, in paragraph
(b) (i), a proviso which makes fair my termination which is 'in
accordance with any applicable agreement, wage regulating
measure or contract of service.'
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The Industrial Court has, over the years, laid down several 
requirements which, in the fairly consistent view of its presiding 
officers, make up procedural fairness. These requirements are that 
the employee be given a fair hearing; that an adequate system of 
warnings precedes the dismissal; and that the employee be given the 
right to appeal if necessary. We shall discuss these in turn. 
A fair hearing 
The requirement of a fair hearing is the most important and 
fundamental aspect of procedural fairness and there have been few 
exceptions to it in the judgements of the Industrial Court. The 
object of a hearing is to enable the employer to hear the employee's 
version of the story to establish the existence or the extent of any 
alleged misconduct or incapacity before a decision is taken. For 
centuries lawyers have used the hearing in the form of courts of law 
as a means of getting to the truth and the device, though not 
infallible, remains the most suitable there is. The hearing also 
enables the employer to take into account any personal or other 
factors which may influence his decision on the question of the 
penalty to be given. 
The need for a hearing is one of the essential principles of natural 
justice, expressed by the maxim 'audi alteram partem' and it places 
much emphasis on the employer being 'seen to be fair'7• This is
important not only to the individual concerned but also to his 
fellow employees who would be more likely to take part in industrial 
7. So well expressed by Lord Hewart in R v SUSSEX JUSTICES ex
parte McCarthy (1924) I KB 256 AT 259 : 'justice should not
only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to
be done. ' See the cases referred to by Edwin Cameron in his
article 'The right to a hearing before Dismissal - Part I'
(1986) 7 ILJ 183 at 206 n 245.
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action in sympathy with him if they perceive the decision to be 
unfair. The value of the process is probably as important as the 
means it provides for establishing the truth,8 for dissatisfaction 
over a decision is most often caused not by the decision itself but 
by the fact that the reasons for it are seen as being improperly 
established. 
In confirming the need for a hearing, the 
numerous occasions referred to the 
Organisation 1 s Recommendation No. 119 of 
Convention No. 158 of 1982, the relevant 
respectively: 
Industrial Court has on 
International Labour 
1963, as well as its 
portions of which read 
"Before a decision to dismiss a worker for serious misconduct 
becomes finally effective, the worker should be given an 
opportunity to state his case •••• 119 and, 
11The employment of a worker shall not be terminated for reasons 
related to the worker I s conduct or performance 
provided an opportunity to defend himself 
11 t. d 1110a ega ,ans ma e •••• 
before he is 
against the 
8. See Baxter Administrative Law (Juta & Co, 1984) AT 536 ff and
Brassey et al The New Labour Law AT 86 for further discussion
on the process value of a hearing.
9. At paragraph 11.5.
10. At Article 7 of Part II.
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The Convention goes on to lay down the exception that the employer 
is not obliged to hear the employee where he 'cannot reasonably be 
expected to provide this opportunity.• This exception has now been 
inserted almost verbatim into our law by the 1988 Labour Relations 
Amendment Act. In terms of paragraph (a) (iii) of the definition of 
an unfair labour practice, the Industrial Court is given the 
authority to decide whether or not it could reasonably have been 
expected of the employer to hold a hearing. A further exception is 
contained in paragraph (a) (ii) of the definition which empowers the 
Court to decide whether the employee was granted a 'fair opportunity 
to state his case 111 and whether a hearing would I not have had a 
different effect on the dismissal 1 • 12 
11. The terms 'hearing', 'disciplinary enquiry' and 'fair
opportunity to state his case' are used in the definition. See
Cameron et al The New Labour Relations Act at 149-151 where the
authors say the first two terms denote a 'measure of
institutional formality' while the third implies a reduced
degree of formality.
12. Edwin Cameron in his article 'The Right to a Hearing before
Dismissal - Problems and Puzzles' (1988) 9 ILJ 147 AT 186,
suggests that the proviso is not an attempt to entrench the
discredited view which held that the lack of a hearing was not
unfair as it would have made no difference in any event ( see
his criticism of this approach at 166-170). His reasoning is
that the provision still necessitates that the employee be
given a fair opportunity to state his case and it does no more
than to a 11 ow the Court to decide whether such an opportunity
ensured as fair a result as a more formal hearing might have
had.
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Prior to the 1988 Amendments, the court had already given effect to 
the exception laid down in the I.LO. Convention No. 158. It did 
this by holding that an employer could be excused for not holding a 
hearing where the circumstances at the time of the dismissal make it 
impracticable for him to do so or where, in other words, he could 
not reasonably be expected to have done so. The court has found 
that such circumstances arise where there is an impending threat to 
life or property which leaves the employer no alternative but to 
dismiss without a hearing.13 Circumstances which have also been 
13. See LEFU & OTHERS v WESTERN AREAS GOLD MINING CO. LTD (1985) 6
ILJ 307 where 205 employees were dismissed without a hearing
soon after the ending of a riot which had killed 9 employees,
injured 304 others and caused several million rands damage to
the mine I s property. See too 11 NUM v BUFFELSFONTEIN GOLD MINING
CO LTD {BEATRIX MINES DIVISION) (1988) 9 ILJ 341 AT 347J - 348D
where the court excused the lack of proper hearings on the same
grounds.
Compare to LEBOTO & OTHERS v WESTERN AREAS GOLD MINING CO. LTD 
(1985) 6 ILJ 299 in which the employer tried to justify the 
dismissals of a further three employees arising from the same 
incident. The difference between this and LEFU was that the 
applicants in this case were dismissed between 15 to 21 days 
after the riot, at a time when life at the mine had returned to 
normal and the threat to life and property had apparently 
passed over. 
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recognised by the Court as making it unnecessary for the employer to 
hold a hearing are those in which the employee himself forfeits his 
right to a hearing.14 
What then are the requirements of a hearing? In what follows we 
shall consider what have become generally accepted as the essential 
elements of a fair hearing. These are : timeous notice; proper 
notice, the right to representation; the right to question and to 
call witnesses; the need to be impartial and that the questions of 
guilt and sanction be considered separately. 
14. See, for example, MFAZWE v S.A. METAL MACHINERY CO. LTD (1987)
8 ILJ 492 in which the poor conduct of the applicant, while he
was being given instructions on how to improve his poor
performance, led the court to find that any proper hearing
could not reasonably have been expected. In the light of this
the employee in TGWU & ANOTHER v INTERSTATE BUS LINES (PTY) LTD
(1988) 9 ILJ 877 (discussed below under Insubordination) who
snatched the di sci pl i nary chairman's notes away from him, and
then ran out of the enquiry, could have come close to
forfeiting his right to be heard. See further on the question
of exceptions to the hearing requirement, Cameron 'The Right to
a Hearing before Dismissal - Problems and Puzzles' (1988) 9 ILJ
147; Cameron et al 'The New Labour Relations Act' (Juta & Co,
1989) 149-151.
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i) Timeous Notice of a Hearing
The employee must be timeously informed of the hearing. 
1 Timeous notice I means giving the employee sufficient time to 
enable him to prepare his case and defence adequately.15
In the case of SIBISI v GELVENOR TEXTILES (PTY) LTD 16, where
the applicant was informed of the enquiry only two hours before 
it took place, Van Schalkwyk was 11 •••• satisfied that even in 
the event of the applicant having been granted an indefinite 
period of time in which to prepare his defence, it could not 
have contributed favourably to the quintessence thereof ••• 11
17
• 
In the case of BOSCH v THUMB TRADING (PTY) LTD18, on the
other hand, where the employee was charged with failing to come 
to work immediately after being released from detention, a 
refusal by the company to accede to his request for a two week 
postponement was held to be unfair in the circumstances. The 
employer was also criticized for not considering the traumatic 
effect which the detention may have had on the applicant. 
15. See, for example, the case of BISSESSOR v BEASTORES T/A GAME
DISCOUNT WORLD (1986) 7 ILJ 334, where Rees A.M. said an
employee, "should be allowed to make a proper defence which
implies that he should be given reasonable time to prepare his
defence •••• 11 (at 337H).
16. (1985) 6 ILJ 122.
17. At 1268 - C thereby adopting the approach that it would have
made no difference in any event).
18. (1986) 7 ILJ 341.
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At the other end of the scale of what is reasonable and timeous 
notice, undue delay on the part of the employer could mean that 
he has 1 • • • •  waived his right to terminate the employment of a 
worker for misconduct if he has failed to do so within a 
reasonable time after he has knowledge of the misconduct 119•
The balance will be found somewhere between allowing the 
employee sufficient time to enable him to prepare his defence 
adequately and ensuring that the enquiry is held 'promptly 
before recollections fade 120 •
As a general rule, a period of 24 to 48 hours would normally be 
seen to be reasonable unless of course there were good reasons 
why the employee needed a longer period. He may for example 
not be able to arrange for his witnesses or representative to 
be available in which event it would not be fair for the 
employer to insist that the hearing proceed. 
19. See paragraph 10 of the International Labour Organisation
Recommendation 166 of 1982, which proposes this.
20. From paragraph 11 of the ACAS Code of Practice, cited by
Cameron in his article 'The Right to a Hearing before Dismissal
- Part l 1 (1986) 7 ILJ 183 AT 200 and 107.
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ii) Proper Notice of Charges and Allegations
Anci 11 ary to the above, is the right of an employee to be 
properly21 advised of a1122 the charges against him before
a hearing is convened. 
enable the aggrieved 
effectively. 
The purpose of a proper notice is to 
(employee) to prepare his defence 
21 • John Brand, in a paper presented to the Institute for 
Industrial Relations entitled 11Dismissals 11 said that it was 
common for the employee to be notified "in writing 11 • This 
makes good sense in practice as it precludes any subsequent
arguments about what the charges were. It also avoids any
dispute about whether or not the employee was advised and about
when he was advised. The failure to notify in writing has
however only once been criticised by the Court. See MAWU AND
OTHERS v TRANSVAAL PRESSED NUTS II BOLTS AND RI VETS ( P TY) LTD
(1988) 9 ILJ 129 AT 135 F-G and 139 A-8. 
22. In NUM & ANOTHER v KLOOF GOLD MINING CO. LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 375,
where there was a discrepancy between the allegations in the
original charge and the allegations formulated at the
conclusion of the enquiry, the court said it could " •••••
reasonably conclude that the employee was prejudiced in
presenting his case. If justice is to be done, then it is
essential that an employee be informed of all the allegations
and charges against him prior to the holding of the enquiry
itself." (at 384D). See ANNAMUNTHODO v OILFIELDS WORKERS TRADE
UNION (l 961) AC 945 (PC) See, too the case of FIHLA v PEST
CONTROL TVL (1984) 5 ILJ 165, which concerned the dismissal of
five employees for the failure to clock in and out properly.
In the proceedings, the employer tried to justify the dismissal
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The need for adequate prior notice was emphasised by Bulbulia 
AM (as he then was) in MAHLANGU v C.I.M. DELTAK 23 where he 
listed it as one of ten ingredients of a fair hearing. The 
need was a 1 so recognised in MAWU v BENBREW STEEL 24, where 
the court found that the charges i ni ti ally presented to the 
dismissed employees were 'vague'. Where, however, there can be 
no doubt about the nature of the charge, the court would 
probably not make the right an essential requirement of 
procedural fairness25• Unless of course, it was satisfied
that the employee had not been properly advised of the time and 
venue of the hearing in which case he would clearly be 
prejudiced. 
22. (Contd) ••• of one applicant, because she had been guilty of 
repeated absenteeism and drunkenness. The court found, 
however, that she was not drunk on the day she was dismissed 
and that she did not "seem to have been confronted with those 
a 11 egations." (at 1698) and see TUCK v S.A. BROADCASTING 
CORPORATION (1985) 6 ILJ 570, where it became apparent to the 
applicant that an informal meeting she had been requested to 
come to, was in fact a " •••• formal 
process of being finalised thus 
opportunity of hearing most of the 
herself." (at 586A} 
23. (1986) 7 ILJ 346 at 357A.
24. (1984) I.C.D.(l) 27 at 28.
enquiry which was in the 
not a 11 owing her the 
allegations made against 
25. See, for example, NUM & OTHERS v DRIEFONTEIN CONSOLIDATED LTD
(1984) 5 ILJ 101 at 145H.
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iii) Entitled to Representation
The employee is entitled to be represented at a di sci pl i nary 
enquiry. The court has been quite consistent in upholding this 
requirement and the failure to allow an employee such 
representation has often contributed to findings of unfair 
di smi ssa l • 26 Where the employee is content to proceed
without a representative however, the court will not generally 
consider the absence serious enough to make the enquiry 
unfair27 •
26. See VAN ZYL v 0 1 0KIEP COPPER CO. LTD (1983) 4 ILJ 125 at
135E-H, DLAMINI v CARGO CARRIERS (1985) 6 ILJ 42 at 48 D-F and
NAAWU v PRETORIA PRECISION CASTINGS (PTY) LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 369
at 378A where the court in all three cases referred, with
approval, to paragraph 11(5) of !LO Recommendation 119 of 1963
which reads : 'Before a decision to dismiss a worker for
serious misconduct becomes finally effective, the worker should
be given an opportunity to state his case promptly, with the
assistance where appropriate of a person representing him. 1 
See, too, KAHN & OTHERS v RAINBOW CHICKEN FARMS (PTY) LTD
(1985) 6 ILJ 60 at 73C; DREYER v FRANZ FALKE TEXTILES (PTY}
LTD (1985) 6 I LJ 223 at 228C; KOY! NI & OTHERS v STRAND BOX
(PTY) LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 453 at 467G; BISSESSOR v BEASTORES (PTY)
LTD T/A GAME DISCOUNT WORLD (1986) 7 ILJ 334 at 337B-C and
MAHLANGU v C.I.M. DELTAK (1986) 7 ILJ 346 at 357B-C.
27. See, for example, the case of NUM & OTHERS v EAST RAND GOLD AND
URANIUM CO (1986) 7 ILJ 739. Although the court criticized the
fact that representation was not allowed at the initial
hearing, it took cognisance of one employee's willingness to
allow the appeal hearing to proceed without a representative he
had requested but who had failed to arrive.
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As to what the entitlement to representation at the hearing 
entails, Bulbulia AM, in MAHLANGU v C.I.M. DELTAK,28 took the
view that it was 'to assist the employee and ensure that the 
discipline procedure is fair and equitable' 29• IN NUM &
ANOTHER v BLINKPAN COLLIERIES LTD3o , FABRICIUS AM, after
emphasizing that representation did not 'mean the mere physical 
but impassive presence of another' 31, went on to list what 
he considered would be necessary duties of a representative. 
He shoula, if he established that the employee did not wish to 
be actively represented, try to ensure that he understood the 
charges, explain the procedure to him and advise him that he 
could challenge any adverse evidence. If the employee wished 
to be actively represented, he should, in addition to what has 
been referred to above, establish the nature of the defence, 
consult with and ensure the attendance of any witnesses and 
generally ensure that the case is as fully presented as 
possible32 •
28. (1986) 7 ILJ 236.
29. At 357C.
30. (1986) 7 ILJ 579.
31. At 583A.
32. At 5838-E Fabricius had also said that a helpful representative
was particularly necessary where the charged worker was
illiterate or uneducated (at 583A). The point was taken a step
further in NUM & ANOTHER v KLOOF GOLD MINING CO. LTD (1986) 7
ILJ 375 at 3838-C where Bulbulia M said that where an employee
was unfamiliar with disciplinary procedures or insufficiently
articulate, he would need a suitable representative to assist
him.
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As to whom the representative may be, it has been ruled that he 
could be 'anyone from the work-place' 33• _ It has also been
suggested that the employer should have a representative 'of 
his choice, including a union official,34 if necessary. 
On the question of when a union representative (either in the 
form of a shop steward or a union official) may be allowed, it 
appears that the court will take into account the provisions of 
the particular disciplinary procedure in question35 • Where
33. MAHLANGU v CIM DELTAK (1986) 7 ILJ 346 at 3578-C. Bulbulia M
gave examples such as a shop steward, a works council
representative, a colleague or a supervisor. See, though, the
rigid approach of the court in MAWU & ANOTHER v HENDLER &
HENDLER (PTY) LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 362 where the employee was
fairly understandably not satisfied with the shop steward
representing him since he belonged to a rival union. His
unheeded request to be represented by a shop steward of his
choice found no sympathy with the court (at 365C).
34. S A LAUNDRY, DRY CLEANING, DYEING and ALLIED WORKERS UN ION &
OTHERS v ADVANCE LAUNDRIES LTD T /A STORK NAPKINS (1985) 6 ILJ
544 at 5698.
35. See WAHL v AECI LTD (1983) 4 ILJ 298 at 3O2H. In this case the
emp 1 oyee had been represented, in both the enquiry and the
appeal, by an employee of his choice but had apparently only
later claimed that he hadn't been adequately represented
because a union representative had not been present. The court
in this case (at 3O2F-H) rather unfortunately interpreted the
meaning of 1 person 1 , in paragraph 11(5) of the 1963 ILO
Recommendation of Termination of Employment, as not to include
a uni on representative thereby, uni ntenti ona lly it seems,
lowering their human status! See, too, the case of MAWU &
ANOTHER v HENDLER & HENDLER (PTY) LTD referred to in n 33 above.
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the procedure is silent, the court will consider whether or not 
the presence of a union representative was requested. Where 
the request is made but refused, the fairness of the refusal 
would depend on the quality of the representation allowed and 
the type or level of employee who is being charged. 
Thus in one case,36 where the employee was a shop steward, 
the court suggested that an employer familiar with good 
industrial relations practices would be aware of the sensitive 
nature of the di smi ssa 1 of such an emp 1 oyee and, 11• • • •  would 
ordinarily advise the Union of the contemplated enquiry prior 
to the event, or ensure that the other shop steward (or shop 
stewards) are present ••••• 11 37• In another case38, any
suggestion that the union was entitled to represent the 
applicants at an enquiry was even rejected by their own 
counsel. It is not clear from the judgement whether any of the 
applicants were shop stewards. 
36. BLACK ALLIED SHOPS, OFFICE AND DISTRIBUTORS TRADE WORKERS UNION
& ANOTHER v HOMEGAS (PTY) LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 411.
37. At 416B-C.
38. NUM & OTHERS v DRIEFONTEIN CONSOLIDATED (1984) 5 ILJ 101 at
145F-G.
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It is clear that the entitlement does not extend to having a 
legal representative39 and this, it is submitted, is
correct. Such an entitlement could complicate matters unduly 
and would create far more delay than there often already is as 
it would necessitate the employer being legally represented as 
well, with all parties having to coincide their diaries. 
iv) The employee must be allowed to question the employer's
witnesses and to call his own
The right to question any hostile witnesses should be
fundamental to a fair hearing as it goes a long way to
establishing the truth or otherwise of their evidence. In
civil and criminal courts, the absence of cross- examination is
seen as an extremely serious irregularity which can almost
39. See NUM & ANOTHER v KLOOF GOLD MINING CO. LTD (1986) ILJ 375 at
383A where Bul bul i a M expressly excluded 1 awyers when ruling
that the need for a representative was an elementary
requirement of justice and in MAWU AND OTHERS v TRANSVAAL
PRESSED NUTS, BOLTS AND RI VETS (1988) 9 I LJ 129 AT 135 H - I
Bulbulia again found that the employer was correct in refusing
legal representation. In the case of MQHAYI v VAN LEER S A
(PTY) LTD (1984) 5 ILJ 179 at 181 C-D, the court unfortunately
made no pronouncement on the fact that an attorney had been
allowed to represent the applicant at an enquiry. cameron in
1The Right to a Hearing before Dismissal - Part I' (1986) 7 ILJ
183 at 207 submits that it is not necessary to allow a 'lawyer
or rank outsider•.
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invariably prejudice a party. 40 The purpose of cross­
examination is two-fold : firstly to elicit evidence which 
could be used against the party; and secondly to cast doubt 
upon the credibility of the witnesses. It goes hand in hand 
with the rights of being present41 and of being fully
informed of the case against one42 • The right was referred. 
to in BISSESSOR v BEASTORES (PTY) LTD T/A GAME DISCOUNT 
40. L H HOFFMAN AND D T ZEFFERT South African Law of Evidence
(Butterworths, 3rd Edition 1 981) 353.
41 . See NUM & ANOTHER v KLOOF GOLD MINING CO LTD (1 986) 7 ILJ 375 
at 385E-H, where Bulbulia M found that the fact that some 
witnesses gave evidence in the absence of the charged employee 
caused the latter to believe that certain members of the 
committee had acted partially. Bulbulia also found that the 
exclusion of the employee was contrary to the principle that 
justice was not only done but al so seen to be done and said 
that it was 'highly desirable' that the employee should at all 
times have been present. 
42. See NUM & OTHERS v TRANSVAAL NAVIGATION COLLIERIES & ESTATE CO.
LTD (1 986) 7 ILJ 393 at 397A, where Roux D P  said that although
the charged employees had been allowed to state their cases,
they could not do so where they did not even know whom their
accusers were. They had merely been confronted with the claim
that affidavits had been made by fellow employees whom they had
allegedly intimidated. They were not told of the names of the
fellow employees nor of the specific contents of the
affidavits. The court found the dismissals to have been
unfair. Contrast though with SAAWU AND ANOTHER v EAST LONDON
MUNICIPALITY referred to in n 51 below.
- 44 -
WORLD43, and was one of the irregularities which made the 
presiding officer decide that a fair enquiry had not been 
held44 •
The right was also impliedly affirmed in NTSHANGASE v ALUSAF 
(PTY) LTD45 and in MAKHATHINI & ANOTHER v UNIPLY (PTY)
LTD46, the court found that an appeal hearing, at which the
applicants had been given the right to ask questions, had 
rectified any such irregularity which there may have been at 
the earlier disciplinary hearing. See too NUM & OTHERS v EAST 
RAND GOLD & URANIUM CO. LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 739 AT 745C-I. 
Despite this, the court has not consistently upheld the 
entitlement largely due to the fact that the issue has arisen 
most often in cases involving the very emotional and prevalent 
offence of intimidation. In the present climate in this 
country where revenge has become so commonplace, the court has 
vacillated a great deal. In some cases it has rigidly insisted 
on the entitlement at the risk of allowing the alleged 
transgressors to go unpunished and in others it has rejected it 
in the interests of pragmatism. 
43. (1986) 7 334 at 3361 - 337A.
44. The other not insubstantial irregularities were that the
applicant had not been given prior warning of the charges
against him, he was not allowed to call his own witnesses and
he did not have a representative. It is doubtful whether the
hearing would have been held to be unfair, had it been the only
i rregul ari ty.
45. (1984) 5 ILJ 336 at 340D.
46. (1985) 6 ILJ 315 at 323D-I.
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In MALAPILE AND ANOTHER v GERMISTON CERAMICS AND POTTERIES, 47 
where the emp 1 oyer had dismissed emp 1 oyees for a 11 eged 
intimidation on the basis of informants• statements which it 
had not disclosed to the accused employees, the court held that 
it would, 
11 • • • • •  not be part of setting its stamp of approval on any 
hearing where charges or so-called charges are put to employees 
by way of informants without such applicants having a proper 
opportunity to consider such either by themselves or through 
their union if necessary or even with the aid of legal 
representatives..... This would go against the grain of any 
concept of fairness and justice as we know it and have known it 
since the early days of Roman-Dutch law 11 • 48 The same 
approach was followed in KOMPECHA v BITE MY SAUSAGE C.c.,49 
where the court ruled that even in a small undertaking an 
employee should be allowed to question her accusers. 
47. (1988) 9 ILJ 855
48. AT 858 G-I This endorsed the view adopted in NUM & OTHERS v
TRANSVAAL NAVIGATION COLLIERIES referred to in n 42 above.
49. (1988) 9 ILJ 1077 AT 1083 A-B
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In NUM & OTHERS v RANDFONTEIN ESTATES GOLD MINING CO. 
(WITWATERSRAND) LTD,50 however, the court adopted a pragmatic
approach. The employer here again, fearing reprisals against its 
witnesses, only allowed their statements to be read out to the 
accused. The employer, the court said, was entitled to take into 
account the reality of threats against the lives of witnesses and 
was in fact 'obliged' to take whatever steps were necessary to 
ensure the safety of its employees.51 This was paramount and was 
apparently more important than the upholding of any principle of law 
or of justice. 
The court in E.A.W.T.U. & ANOTHER v THE PRODUCTIONS CASTING CO. 
(PTY) LTD,52 in which an application had been made to examine a 
witness privately, set out some considerations which it felt should 
be taken into account before any such application would be allowed. 
These considerations provide useful guidelines which go some way at 
least in drawing together the court's seemingly irreconcilable 
decisions. 
50. (l 988) 9 ILJ 859
51. AT 869 A-C. See, too, the unreported case of SAAWU AND ANOTHER
v EAST LONDON MUNICIPALITY DATED 7.12.87 in which the court
adopted a similar approach and upheld a dismissal which had
relied on evidence contained in affidavits, blanked-out
versions of which had been shown to the applicant.
52. (1988) 9 ILJ 902
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The court firstly warned of the dangers of allowing the 
evidence of accusers to be heard without being challenged. 
This could, it went on, open a 1 Pandora 1 s 1 box to let elements 
of secrecy, covertness, prejudice and even malice enter the 
question. Secondly, the evidence would at 1 east have to be 
material if not decisive and thirdly, there would have to be a 
very real possibility that the witness would indeed be harmed 
if his identity was known.53 
Enabling the employee to call his own witnesses is a part of 
allowing him to present his case as fully as he can and the 
court has in a number of cases considered it to be one of the 
requirements of a fair hearing.54 
It would seem to be necessary for the employee to request to 
call the witness and for the request to be turned down, before 
the employer would be seen to have acted unfairly.55 
53. AT 706 E-G
54. See, for example S A LAUNDRY, DRY CLEANING, DYEING & ALLIED
WORKERS UNION v ADVANCE LAUNDRIES T /A STORK NAPKINS (1985) 6
ILJ 544 at 5698; BISSESSOR v BEASTORES(PTY) LTD T/A GAME
DISCOUNT WORLD (1986) 7 ILJ 334 at 337A-B and 3371; MAHLANGU v
CIM DELTAK, GALLANT v CIM DELTAK (1986) 7 ILJ 346 at 357C-D.
55. See, BUILDING CONSTRUCTOR & ALLIED WORKERS' UNION OF S A &
OTHERS v JOHNSON TILES (PTY) LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 210 at 216!.
Al though see the BISSESSOR case cited above, where the court
apparently ignored the employer 1 s claim that the employee had
not requested to call a witness and accepted the employee 1 s
allegation that he was simply not afforded the opportunity (at
337A-B).
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v) The Chainnan of the Hearing must be Impartial
This requirement is essential and embodies the principle of 
natural justice expressed by the maxim 'nemo index in sua causa' 
The requirement is tempered by the fact that in the employment 
relationship, there is always the possibility of some 
prejudging having taken place due to the proximity of the 
parties. The courts have accordingly been fairly reluctant to 
make findings that the Chairman of the enquiry was biased or 
impartial and it is only where there is some clear indication 
to the contrary that it has done so. 
Such indications have taken the form of a notice of di smi ssa l 
having been prepared and signed prior to the employee being 
invited prior to state his case56• Another example of such
an indication was where from a reading of the transcript of the 
disciplinary enquiry the impression was gained that it had been 
conducted in a 11domi neeri ng and high-handed way and was not 
completely impartial 11 57• In another case, the court found
that there was an "obvious lack of impartiality" due to the 
nepotism of the chairman of the enquiry58 •
56. NOOOELE v MOUNT NELSON HOTEL & ANOTHER (1984) 5 ILJ 216 at 225G
in which the court took into account the "applicant's appraisal
of the meeting that the hotel had already decided to dismiss
him" (at 225H). See, too, BISSESSOR v BEASTORES T/A GAME
DISCOUNT WORLD (1986) 7 ILJ 334 at 337C-F.
57. In NUM & ANOTHER v UNISEL GOLD MINES LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 398 at
403C-D.
58. TUCK v S A  BROADCASTING CORPORATION (1985) 6 ILJ 570 at 5891.
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In NUM & ANOTHER v KLOOF GOLD MINING CO Ltd59, the court 
found that the chairman of the enquiry had taken a 'jaundiced 
view of the case.' Bulbulia M said this was clear from the 
record which showed he had only taken into account factors 
which were unfavourable to the employee. His partiality was 
a 1 so apparent from remarks he had written on the di sci p 1 i nary 
form to the effect that the employee appeared to be an 
undesirable person who threatened other people and, lastly, the 
court found that his decision to dismiss had been influenced by 
the fact that the uni on had ca 11 ed for a 1 ega 1 strike and the 
employee was the chairman of the shaft stewards' committee60 •
In MHLONGO v SA FABRICS LTD61 , however, the court rejected a
'bald accusation' by the applicant that the enquiry was biased 
because it took the form of a senior manager merely endorsing 
the decision of a subordinate to dismiss. 
vi) Questions of Guilt and Sanction to be Considered Separately
There have been a number of cases which have es tab 1 i shed an
employee's entitlement to be heard not only on the question of
his guilt or otherwise but also on the question of what
sanction would be most fair in the circumstances. The
requirement at times seems to contradict the need for
consistency but it has become an essential to a fair hearing.
59. (1986) 7 ILJ 375. 
60. At 387C-H.
61. (1985) 6 ILJ 248 at 251C.
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The necessity for the dual function of a hearing was first 
noted62 in FIHLA & OTHERS v PEST CONTROL TVL, 63 where
Hiemstra AM, in finding that the applicants had made out a 
prima facie case of unfair dismissal, listed, as one of three 
reasons, the fact that 11 • • • • their personal circumstances and 
their past work records do not seem to have been considered 
when it was decided to dismiss them.11 
Erasmus AM, as has been his wont, reversed the trend in 
ROSENBERG v MEGA PLASTICS (PTY) L To64 and found that the test
in unfair dismissal was an objective one and the court could 
not 1 take into consideration the applicant's personal or family 
circumstances.' The court decided it could not bend the rules 
for the applicant and applied the company's disciplinary code 
rigidly. 65 
62 . The opportunity to 11• • • •  put forward any comment they wished to
make ••••• 11 given to an employee 1 s representatives in respect of 
a suggestion by management that the employee be dismissed, had 
been referred to by Van Schalkwyk M in an earlier case but the 
reference was incidental to the matter; see MWASA & OTHERS v 
THE ARGUS PRINTING & PUBLISHING COMPANY LTD (1984) 5 ILJ 16 at 
23B-E. 
63. (1984) 5 ILJ 165 at l69E.
64. (1984) 5 ILJ 29 at 32H-I.
65. At 33B.
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The need for the dual function was emphasized in NAAWU PRETORIA 
PRECISION CASTINGS (PTY) L rn66 where Fabricius AM referred to
the ILO Recommendation in this regard, and said that it should 
not be viewed only as a recommendation but that it formed part 
of South African law. 67 He went on to refer to the English
case of JOHN v REES,68 where it was pointed out that 11 • • • •  
the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut 
cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges. which, 
in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct 
which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable 
determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change ••••• 11 
69 and concluded that, "There may be something to be said in
support of the I open and shut I approach when it comes to the 
consideration of guilt but when it comes to the imposition of a 
sanction I do not believe it can ever be apposite 11 •70
The importance of the separation of guilt and sanction has 
perhaps nowhere in our law been more clearly expressed than in 
66. (1985) 6 ILJ 369.
67. At 378A-B.
68. 1970 ChD 345.
69. At 400.
70. At 379H. See, too, at 378E-F.
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MOAHLODI v EAST RAND GOLD MINE AND URANIUM CO. L TD 71 when 
Bulbulia M, in dealing with the belief of the employer that it 
was up to the employee to raise mitigating factors, said, 
11The boot should have been on the other leg. It is the tacit 
duty of every person who is entrusted with the responsibility 
of having to mete out punishment, to obtain all relevant 
information about an employee's personal circumstances as well 
as his service record and if need be to lean over backwards in 
an effort to find other extenuating circumstances in the 
employee's favour.1172
The need for warnings to precede dismissal 
It is generally accepted that an employee should be warned if there 
is a possibility of his losing his job. 
The principle applies not only to dismissal on the grounds of 
misconduct or incompetence, but also to cases where the operational 
requirements of the employee necessitate dismissal or retrenchment. 
71. (1988) 9 ILJ 597
72. AT 605 F-G. The principle has also been followed in the
following cases : NUM & ANOTHER v WESTERN AREAS GOLD MINING CO
LTD ( 1985) 6 I LJ 380 at 386C; and in B ISSESSOR v BEASTORES
(PTY) LTD T/A GAME DISCOUNT WORLD (1986) 7 ILJ 334 at 33 7E-F
where it was more formally expressed as being an 'opportunity
to plead in mitigation of the penalty'.
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The purpose of warnings in cases involving misconduct is an attempt 
1 to make the employee change, and (an indication) to him of the 
consequences I if such an attempt is unsuccessful. 73 The purpose 
of warnings in cases of incompetence, is along much the same lines 
and is to make the employee aware of the standard required and to 
afford him the opportunity of improving to attain that 
standard.74 The purpose of warning employees about a possible 
retrenchment, on the other hand, would be to afford them the 
opportunity of suggesting a practicable alternative to prevent 
retrenchment, and, where there was no such alternative, to allow 
them a reasonable period within which they could hopefully 
restructure their working lives by obtaining employment elsewhere. 
73. Per the English Employment appeal Tribunal in PLASTICISERS LTD
v HAROLD AMOS, cited by Steven Anderman in The Law of Unfair
Dismissal (Butterworths, 2nd edition, 1985) at 136.
74. See, for Example, the case of SAAWU & OTHERS v ROQUE CO. T/A
TECHNIMOULD (1986) !CD (1) 321 where Bulbulia M was critical of
the manner in which employees were alleged to have been
warned. The company claimed to have endorsed warnings on 
employees' clock-cards 1 in the expectation• that they would 
read them. The court al so quoted with approval the English 
case of JAl'<lES v WAL THAM, HOLY CROSS, which found that, 11an 
empl ayer should be very slow to dismiss upon the grounds that 
an employee is incapable of performing work which he is 
employed to do, without first telling the employee of the 
respects in which he is failing to do his job adequately, 
warning him of the possibilities or likelihood of dismissal on 
this ground and giving him an opportunity of improving his 
performance. 11 
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In cases of dismissal on grounds of incompatibility, warnings are 
inappropriate. The reason for this is based on the assumption that 
an employee would seldom change his character, or be able to do so, 
in order to make himself compatible with his employer, and 
consequently no amount of warnings . would ensure that he did so. 
Thus, in STEVENSON v STERNS JEWELLERS (PTY) LTD,75 the court 
accepted that the employee's 'particular style of management' did 
not suit the company and found that whether or not he was warned was 
not decisive. 
Warnings in cases of dismissal for incapacity due to ill health, are 
similarly inappropriate for the simple reason that a man cannot be 
warned to get well again. 
A warning may take the form of a particular warning to a single 
employee or it may be in the form of a general rule aimed at all 
employees. Rycroft76 distinguishes the two by referring to the
former as a specific warning and to the latter as a general 
warning. A general warning, he points out, gives notice of the 
employer's intention to enforce an aspect of discipline or to expand 
the list of disciplinary offences and ensuing sanctions.77• 
75. (1986) 71LJ 318 at 324D-E. This case, in which the applicant
had been appointed as the Managing Director of the respondent
and had been dismissed three weeks later, established
incompatibility as a separate category for dismissal of the
first time in South Africa.
76. Alan Rycroft 'Between Employment and Dismissal: The 
Disciplinary Procedure.• (1985) 6 ILJ 405 at 420.
77. !bid.
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Thus, where a disastrous fire in one of the branches of a large 
department store was caused by a short circuit, it had led to strict 
warnings that all plugs were to be removed at the end of each day. 
The failure to obey this apparently trifling warning, the court 
subsequently held, justified the dismissal of the employee who was 
already on a final warning for the same type of offence.78 
The nature of warnings requres a di sti ncti on to be drawn between 
oral, written and final written warnings. It is common practice for 
disciplinary codes to provide for such a progression and if an 
employer has a code, the court expects him to abide by it.79 
78. See, CCAWUSA AND ANOTHER v O.K .  BAZAARS 1929 Ltd. (1986) 7 ILJ
438 at 439 G - H. See, too, SWANEPOEL v AECI LTD (1984) 5 ILJ
41, cited by Rycroft, where the development of inter-racial
conflict had necessitated a general rule prohibiting such
conduct and the applicant, who was subsequently dismissed for
derogatorily referring to a black man as a 'fur' was held by
the court to have been fairly dismissed. And, see, NUM AND
ANOTHER v BLINKPAN COLLIERIES LTD. (1986) 7 ILJ 579 at 582 A -
D for an example of the two being confused. Also see NAAWU v
PRETORIA PRECISION CASTINGS (PTY) LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 369 AT 373
A- D.
79. See, for example, SFAWU AND ANOTHER v DELMAS KUIKENS (1986) 7
ILJ 628 where the employer who had a code requiring three
written warnings, including a final written warning was held to
have unfairly dismissed an employee after he had received only
two written warnings. The court found that the respondent 'by
notifying its employees of the disciplinary code led the
employees legitimately to expect that unless they accumulated
three written warnings for the specified minor offences they
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Oral warnings, or reprimands, are not given much weight since the 
court adopts the approach that they indicate a less serious attitude 
on the part of the employer.80 
Written warnings, on the other hand, are generally given more 
attention although the court has in the past been wary of the fact 
that written warnings are sometimes given for offences which are not 
necessarily serious. It has consequently held that it will 
investigate and consider the nature and seriousness of the previous 
offences. 81 
79. (Contd) would not be dismissed.' (At 634. 1-J). See, too,
RHODES v S A  BIAS BINDING MANUFACTURERS (PTY) LTD (1985) 6 ILJ
106 at 120 D-F; NUM AND ANOTHER v BLINKPAN COLLIERIES LTD
(1986) 7 ILJ 579 at 582A and at 582 E-G; FIHLA AND OTHERS v
PEST CONTROL TVL. (PTY) LTD. (1984) 5 lLJ 165 at 168G and 169C.
80. See VANZYL v O'OKIEP COPPER CO LTD (1983)4 ILJ 125 at 134A;
DLAMINI v CARGO CARRIERS (NATAL) (PTY) LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 42 at
48A and FIHLA AND OTHERS v PEST CONTROL TVL. (PTY) LTD (1984) 5
ILJ at 168 G-H.
81. NODLELE v MOUNT NELSON HOTEL AND ANOTHER (1984)5 ILJ 216 at 225
C-D. See, too, WAHL v AECI LTD. (1983)4 ILJ 298 at 305 A where
the employee had received five previous written warnings, some 
of which were considered by the court not to have been of a 
serious nature; NTSHANGASE v ALUSAF (PTY) LTD (1984) 5 ILJ 
336 at 341 F-G where the court queried the validity of a 
previously issued final warning; NUM and ANOTHER v UNISEL GOLD 
MINES LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 398 at 403 A-B where a warning given for 
recruiting activities, when access for that purpose had not 
been granted, was considered to have fallen away when access 
was subsequently all owed; and MAWU AND ANOTHER v HENDLER AND 
HENDLER (PTY) LTD (1985)6 ILJ 362 at 365E - 366C. 
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Another factor which the court takes into account is the number of 
warnings an employee has had, and especially if he has had a final 
warning. Thus, where an employee had 'previous warnings including a 
final warning for persistent non-compliance with laid down 
procedures', and had left his workplace, an offence which, 'if taken 
in isolation, would not justify his dismissal', the court held that 
he had been fairly dismissed.82 
Of particular relevance are warnings which are of the same nature as 
the offence for which the employee is dismissed,83 in much the 
same way as the criminal courts order that a suspended sentence is 
82. See, too, CCAWUSA AND ANOTHER v OK BAZAARS 1929 Ltd (1986)7 ILJ
438 at 439E - 440E; NUM AND ANOTHER v BLINKPAN COLLIERIES LTD
(1986)7 ILJ 579 at 582E-G where the alleged final warning was
held to have not been 'unequivocally final 'as required by the
respondent I s code and was consequently not considered to have
had the effect of a true final warning.
83. See, for example, MQHAYI v VAN LEER SA (PTY) LTD. (1984)5 ILJ
179 at 181D; MAWU AND NDEBELE v SA TRACTION MANUFACTURERS
(1985) ICD ( l ) 32; CCAWUSA AND ANOTHER v OK BAZAARS 1929 LTD
(1986) 7 ILJ 438 at 439E - 440E, and NUM AND ANOTHER v WESTERN
AREAS GOLD MINING CO. (1985) 6 ILJ 380 at 388F-H where the
court ruled that an employer was entitled to take a 'common
sense' approach to the relevance of previous charges of
assault, even though the employee had been acquitted on both
occasions. See, too, BASODTWU & ANOTHER v HOMEGAS (1986) 7 ILJ
411 AT 416 E-F.
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to come into operation if the criminal is found guilty of committing 
the same crime or a crime of a similar nature. Rycroft84 says
that the 1 • • • •  trend appears to be that a warning can lapse only if 
the employee is not found guilty of any offence ••• • but the 'trend 
has not been that clear. The court has in one case taken unrelated 
warnings into account85 but has expressed a reluctance to do so in
another. 86
As to what time period must lapse before warnings are considered to 
fall away, Bul bul i a M, in the case of NUM AND ANOTHER v EAST RAND 
PROPRIETARY MINES87 said that in the absence of any agreed
procedure, • •••• it would not be reasonable to assume that the 
tenure of a warning could last indefinitely', and concluded that 
• •••• it would appear to be a good principle that a written warning
lapses after six months. 1 This was approved of in a subsequent case
in which the court also expressed the view that the seriousness of
the offence should be taken into account in determining the period
of a warning's validity.88
84. See Alan Rycroft 'Between Employment and Dismissal: The 
Disciplinary Procedure'. (1985) 6 ILJ 405 at 421.
85. In the unreported case of ZAKWE v AECI LTD case No NH 13/2/77
dated 3 February l 984 in Brassey et al The New Labour Law at
411 n 38.
86. See MOFOKENG v B B BREAD (1984) ICD (l) 34 at 35. See, too,
CCAWUSA AND ANOTHER v WOOL TRU LTD T / A WOOLWORTHS ( RANDBURG)
(1989) 10 ILJ 311 in which the court found that an undue
reliance had been placed on unrelated warnings.
87. (1987) 8 ILJ 315.
88. In CCAWUSA v WOOLTRU referred to in n 86 above.
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The right to an Appeal 
It has become a fairly well established practice for employers to 
allow employees to appeal against the finding or penalty of a 
disciplinary enquiry to a higher level of management and the 
practice has, to a certain extent, been encouraged by the Industrial 
Court.89
The purpose of an appeal, like an enquiry, is to decide on the 
misconduct, incapacity or incompetence of the employee, and to 
decide on the appropriate disciplinary action, after a consideration 
of all circumstances.9° Cameron91 refers to the right as a
89. See MAHLANGU v CIM DELTAK (1 986) 7 ILJ 346 at 357 E-F;
SALDCDAWU v ADVANCE LAUNDRIES T/A STORK NAPKINS (1985)6 ILJ 544
at 569 B-C and MAWU AND OTHERS v TRANSVAAL PRESSED NUTS, BOLTS
AND RIVETS (PTY) LTD. (1988) 9 ILJ 1 29 at 139 G-H, in which,
for the first time, the employer's failure to inform the
employee of his right to appeal was considered to be an
irregularity. See, too, PILLAY v C.G. SMITH SUGAR LTD (1985) 6
ILJ 530 at 538E; SWANEPOEL v AECI LTD. (1984) 5 ILJ 41 at
44F; MAWU AND MAGUBANE v SA TRACTION MANUFACTURERS (1984) !CD
(l) 29 at 30 where the fact that appeals had been heard was
referred to as a matter of course.
90. Where the employee does not query the finding in respect of
guilt but believes the penalty to be inappropriate, his appeal
should naturally only be necessary in respect of the latter.
See in this regard, FINCK v OHLSSONS CAPE BREWERIES (1985) KD
(1) 20 cited in Brassey et al The New Labour Law 419 n 140.
91. Cameron 'The Right to a Hearing Before Dismissal.' (1988) 9 ILJ
147 at 160.
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'mature reconsideration by persons detached from the initial 
assessment,' and, as such, it is especially useful and important 
when different surrounding circumstances to those at the enquiry 
exist. 92 Another advantage is that properly conducted, an appeal 
by its very nature, lying, as it does to another person, should 
provide a safeguard against bias. 
There has been a fair amount of uncertainty over whether an appeal 
hearing, in the form of a re-hearing, can remedy an irregular 
enquiry. In MAKHATINI AND ANOTHER v UNIPLY (PTY) LTD,93 the court
said that even if it was accepted that the enquiry was unfair, it 
could not, ' ••••• be overlooked that an appeal was allowed which was 
conducted on the basis that it was a full hearing and every 
opportunity was given to all concerned to ask questions and put 
their respective cases. ' 94 A similar approach was adoptedby the
court in NUM AND ANOTHER v ZINC CORPORATION OF SA95 where an
appeal in the form of a re-hearing was held to have remedied a 
serious defect in the enquiry. 
92. See, for example, NUM AND ANOTHER v UNISEL GOLD MINES LTD
(1 986) 7 ILJ 398 at 403 E-G, where the court said, in respect
of, inter alia, a charge of inviting others to strike, the fact
that the strike had not taken place should have been considered
as a mitigating factor at the appeal, when this fact was known.
93. (1 985) 6 ILJ 31 5 .
94. At 323 G-H.
95. (1 987) 8 ILJ 499 at 502.
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The Appelate Division decision of TURNER v JOCKEY CLUB OF SA96 is
normally cited as authority for the contrary view that where an 
individual is entitled to a fair hearing followed by an appeal, a 
defect in the hearing cannot be rectified by a re-hearing or 
appeai.97• 
What the argument depends on, however, is the basis of the 
entitlement. In TURNER, there was a contractual entitlement while 
in the MAKHATHINI and ZINC CORPORATION cases, there was no such 
entitlement. It is not correct to say that fairness 'requires a 
fair enquiry foll owed by a fair appeal. 1 98 All that fairness 
does require, in terms of one of the principles of natural justice, 
is that an employee is given a fair hearing. As Brassey99 says, 
an employer's, 
'obligations at law ••••• require him to give the employee a 
fair hearing and are satisfied by a proper appeal in the nature 
of a re-hearing just as much as by a proper enquiry.• 
96. 1974 (3) SA 633 (A) at 656F - 658H.
97. See, for example, Cameron 'The Right to a Hearing before
Dismissal 1 (1986) 7 ILJ 183 at 214 - 215 and also, in the
second part of the article entitled 'The Right to a Hearing
before Dismissal - Problems and Puzzles' (1988) 9 ILJ 147 at
159.
98. As Cameron seems to suggest in 'Problems and Puzzles' at 159
(referred to in the footnote a above.) although it may indeed
be good for industrial relations.
99. See Brassey et al The New Labour Law 89.
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If there is a contractual entitlement, on the other hand, in terms 
of which an employee is to be given two full hearings, the position 
will be different and will depend on what the entitlement entails. 
Given the court 1 s tendency to expect an employer to abide by his 
procedure,100 it is unlikely that the approach in MAKHATHINI and 
ZINC CORPORATION would be foll owed where the procedure in question 
allows two full hearings. 
Aligned to this is the question whether, where the enquiry has been 
fair, the re-hearing of evidence at the appeal is necessary. In 
ROBBERTZE v MATTHEW RUSTENBURG REFINERIES, lOl the court held that
it was not necessary to recall witnesses for cross-examination and 
all that was required was for the enquiry proceedings to be 
reviewed. 
This approach would be the correct one, as long as the relevant 
procedure did not entitle an appeal in the form of a re-hearing. 
The view adopted in ROBBERTZE would al so depend on whether it was 
practically possible to review the evidence,102 in the same way
that an appeal court is able to review the record of the court a 
quo. If there were no records of the evidence at the enquiry, in 
the form of a transcript, detailed minutes or statements, the appeal 
would have to be a re-hearing to enable evidence to be considered. 
100. See n 79 above.
101. (1986)7 ILJ 64 at 69 B-D.
102. Related to this aspect, see ROBBERTZE at 69 D-H where the court
held that the employer's failure to give the employee's
representative a copy of the record of the enquiry and written
statements prevented his case being properly presented and was
consequently an irregularity.
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Provided there was no entitlement to a re-hearing in the procedure 
and provided it was possible to review the enquiry proceedings, the 
only oral evidence fairness would require the appeal to hear, would 
be that of witnesses who were unable to be present at the enquiry or 
of witnesses who had only come forward after the enquiry. 
One further question needs to be considered. Where there is a 
right, be it to a re-hearing or to a review, wi 11 the court not 
require the employee to exercise that right prior to approaching the 
court for relief? The answer to this has consistently been answered 
in the negative, particularly where it can be shown that attempts 
were made to settle the dispute as was the case in both MATSHOBA & 
OTHERS v FRY IS METALS ( PTY) LTD l o3 and NUM & ANOTHER v KLOOF GOLD
MINING CO LTo.104 A further factor taken into account in MATSHOBA
was that the thirty day period within which an employee had to file 
his �pplication limited his attempts to pursue an appeai.105
So, it can be agreed that procedural fairness basically requires 
that prior to a decision to dismiss being taken, an employee should 
be given a fair hearing and he should be warned where his breach is 
not so gross as to justify dismissal on its own. We have also seen 
that once he has been dismissed, it is fair to allow him to appeal 
against the decision. We now go on to look at the substantive and, 
as its name indicates, more important aspect of dismissal. 
103. (1983) 4 ILJ 107 at 122 B-F.
104. (1986) 7 ILJ 375 at 388 A-G.
l 05. AT 122 G-H. See too ROSSOUW v S.A. MEDI ESE NAVORSINGSRAAD
(1987) 8 ILJ 650 at 659 C-E and see the recent Supreme Court 
cases reflecting the same approach : MSOMI v ABRAHAMS NO & 
ANOTHER 1981 ( 2) SA 256 ( N) AT 260-1 and RAMPA & ANDERE v 
REKTOR, TSHIYA ONDERWYSKOLLEGE & ANDERE 1986 (1) SA 424 (0) AT 
430 I cited in Cameron 'The Right to a Hearing before 
Dismissal - Part l 1 (1986) 7 ILJ 183 at 215 n 193. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT 
It has been seen that before the concept of an unfair labour 
practice was introduced, employment contracts could generally be 
terminated at the will of either party by the giving of notice. 
That is no longer the position and it is now necessary to have a 
good substantive reason for dismissing an employee. The 1988 
Amendments to the Labour Relations Act firmly entrenched the element 
of substantive fairness into the definition by stipulating that 
dismissals by reason of disciplinary action must be for a 'valid and 
fair reason' •1 The dismissal, in other words, must be justified. 
To ensure this, the law a 11 ows an independent body, in the form of 
the Industrial Court, to assess the facts and to decide whether the 
dismissal was justified or fair. 
There are naturally numerous reasons for dismissal, but they can 
basically be separated into categories of misconduct, incompetence, 
incapacity due to ill health, incompatibility and the operational 
requirements of the business.2• 
l • In terms of paragraph (a) of the defi ni ti on introduced by the 
Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 83 of 1988. 
2. Due to the collective nature of this reason, it is not to form
part of this thesis. See H Cheadle 'Retrenchment : The New
Guidelines' (1985) 6 ILJ 127; Brassey et al The New Labour Law
(Juta & Co, 1987) 279-297; Cameron et al The New Labour
Relations Act (Juta & Co, 1989) 120-129.
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The test of substantive fairness involves a two-stage approach. 
Firstly, it must be established whether the employee committed the 
act of misconduct or was incompetent, incapacitated or incompatible 
or, in the terms of the 1988 Amendments, there must be a valid 
reason for the dismissal. Secondly, the seriousness of the breach 
is considered and, once assessed, will lead to the decision as to 
how significantly this affects the particular contract or 
relationship between the employer and the employee. This would make 
up the second requirement in the recently amended definition, namely 
that there is a fair reason. Various factors, such as whether the 
employee has ever been warned,3 whether his service record is 
unblemished, or whether other employees have in the past been 
dismissed for similar breaches, will either aggravate or alleviate 
the degree of seriousness. Fortunately the legislature has not 
attempted to define substantive fairness. By requiring only that 
the reason for a dismissal be valid and fair, it left the concept as 
broad as it indeed is, enabling the Court to continue fashioning 
what it believes is fair or unfair in any given circumstances. To 
do otherwise would have been pure folly. 
The substantive fairness of the reasons for dismissal will now be 
dealt with in their separate categories. 
3. The 'procedural' requirement for warnings is inextricably
linked to substantive fairness in the same way that the
requirement for a hearing is, in that they both make it easier
for the employer to reach fair decisions in the two stages of
the search for substantive fairness. If the employee can
truthfully say that he had no idea his action would 1 ead to
di smi ssa 1 and that he had never been warned of this, either
personally or by means of a disciplinary code or general rule,
this could seriously affect the substantive fairness of the
dismissal.
- 66 -
MISCONDUCT 
The dismissal of an employee on this ground occurs as a result of 
his failure to abide by the rules or terms which govern his 
particular job. 
The terms or rules regulating his employment would depend on his 
specific employment contract, or the nature of his job4 or, more
generally, on what industry it is in or, what general company rules 
and disciplinary codes were in existence at the time. This contract 
could also be regulated by what was contained in Industrial 
legislation or other applicable wage regulating measures such as 
Wage Determinations under the Wage Act No. 5 of 1957 or Industrial 
Council Agreements in terms of the Labour Relations Act No. 28 of 1956. 
The reasons themselves can generally be classified under the same 
breaches as those recognised at common law for dismissal without 
notice. 5 These are basically: absence from work, assault, 
dishonesty, drunkeness, failure to obey instructions, 
insubordination, negligence and sleeping on duty. 
4. See, for example, ROSENBERG v MEGA PLASTICS (1985) ICD (1) 20
in which it was found to be very serious for a driver of a
heavy duty vehicle to be drunk. Had the employee not been in
control of dangerous machinery, the offence would not have been
so serious. ( The case is referred to under the heading of
Drunkenness below).
5. Which were necessary for the dismissal to have been lawful in
the event of proper notice not having been given. See
Chapter l above.
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(a) Absence from Work
This offence reaffirms the importance of having an enquiry, not 
for establishing that the employee was absent, for this is 
usually no problem, but to establish the reason for his 
absence. The fairness or otherwise of the dismissal will 
depend on the reason for the absence. 
The Court has been assuringly qui ck to come to the assistance 
of employees whose reasons for absence had been that their 
1 i ves would have been endangered had they come to work. In 
BASODTWU AND ANOTHER v HOMEGAS (PTY) L TD6, for example, the
court approved of the approach of employers who had been 11 •• • 
particularly sensitive to the predicament of black employees 
caught (often literally) in the cross-fire of unrest which has 
enveloped many black residential areas, and have not regarded 
an absence from work in such circumstances as sufficient ground 
for terminating the services of the defaulting employees." 7 
The court took a similar view in SALDCDAWU AND OTHERS v ADVANCE 
LAUNDRIES T/A STORK NAPKINS,8 where the employer was advised 
that he should have taken account of the reality of violence 
and intimidation during stayaways and should not have dismissed 
employees who would have risked their lives by remaining at 
work any longer than they did. In the judgement special 
mention is made of the evidence of one employee who said under 
cross-examination that while she was aware that her employer 
6. (1986)7 ILJ 411.
7. At 417 B-C.
8. (1985) 6 ILJ 544.
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would not have been happy with her leaving early, 'she valued 
her life more than her employer's happiness'.9
In a similar vein the court, in BOSCH v THUMB TRADING (PTY) 
LTD,10 held that it was 'highly unreasonable' for the
employer to expect an employee to return to work the day after 
he was released from detention under the emergency regulations 
and the 'traumatic effect' which the detention must have had on 
him justified his unauthorized absence.11
Where there is an element of disobedience or lack of regard for 
agreements or procedures in the absence, the court has been 
less willing to come to the assistance of employees. Thus, in 
SOSIBO AND OTHERS v QUALITY PRODUCTS (PTY) LTD, 12 where the
absence from work on a public holiday in contravention of an 
agreement that non-statutory holidays in the middle of the week 
would be worked in return for another day's leave, the 
dismissal was found to be fair.13 
9. At 566 H-I.
10. (1986)7 ILJ 341.
11. At 345 C-D.
12. (1986 )7 ILJ 621.
13. The employer had offered the employees a two-week suspension as
an alternative to dismissal but the offer was refused. The
case is to be contrasted with SACWU & OTHERS v C.E. INDUSTRIAL
(PTY) LTD T/A PANVET (1988) 9 ILJ 639 where the employees'
disobedience was tempered by the insensitivity and unfairness
of the employer.
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In BCAWU AND OTHERS v JOHNSON TILES (PTY} LTD, 14 the court
adopted a similar approach where, although the facts smacked of 
victimization and constructive dismissal, a disobeyed 
instruction and a failure by the employee to air his grievances 
through an established procedure, were factors it took into 
account in deciding that the dismissal was fair.15
Generally, however, absence from work without permission does 
not appear to warrant dismissal, especially if it is a first 
offence. In RADEBE v KEELEY FORWARDING (PTY} LTD,16 the
employee, who was a security guard who had absented himself 
from his post for half an hour to go to the toilet, was found 
to have been guilty of misconduct, 1 but not so serious as to 
warrant dismissal,17 particularly since there was no proof of
written warnings having been given. Similarly, a failure to be 
punctual, a lesser form of unauthorized absence, is more 
aJropriately sanctioned by means of warnings.18
14. (1985)6 ILJ 210 at 217 - 222.
15. At 222 C-F.
16. (1988)9 ILJ 504. See, too, NUM AND OTHERS v TRANSVAAL
NAVIGATION COLLIERIES AND ESTATE CO. (1986)7 ILJ 393 at 397C-I
and NUM AND ANOTHER v BLINKPAN COLLIERIES LTD. (1986)7 ILJ 563.
17. At 506 E-F.
18. See, for example, MAWU AND ANOTHER v HENDLER AND HENDLER (PTY}
LTD (1985 )6 ILJ 362 at 3651 where the court found that coming
five minutes late justified a written warning.
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(b) Drunkenness
In proving drunkenness, employers have sometimes resorted to 
using breathalyzers to test the alcohol level of 
employees.19 The test is a good one in that it is objective
but the employee's consent is necessary before it can be 
administered. If he doe? refuse, an adverse inference can, of 
course, always be drawn from such refusal. 
An admission by the employee that he has been drinking alcohol 
is normally sufficient provided the offence for which he is 
charged is actually consuming alcohol and not that of being 
drunk, for the former of course only leads to the latter once 
the amount consumed is significant. 2° From this it follows
that where the employee is charged with drunkenness, an .!' .,., ,,,-. _.,. 
19. See, for example, the case of ROSENBERG v MEGA PLASTICS (PTY)
LTD. (1984)4 ILJ 291 at 30I-31A, where the employee, in
addition to having tested positive, admitted at the enquiry to
having had possibly four or five beers. See, too, MOFOKENG v
B.B. BREAD (1984) ICD (l) 34 at 35, in which two breathalyzer
tests with different instruments, one proving positive and the
other negative, had been conducted. The court seemed to take
this into account when it inferred that requiring the employee
to attend an enquiry while he was allegedly drunk, was an
indication that he 'could only have been slightly intoxicated.'
20. See FINCK AND ANOTHER v OHLSSONS CAPE BREWERIES. (1985)6 ICD
(1) 20 at 21 for an example of a factory rule making the mere
consumption of alcohol on company premises a dismissable
offence.
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admission that he has been drinking will only go some way 
towards proving drunkenness. Additional evidence will be 
necessary and this normally takes the form of observations by 
witnesses that his breath was smelling of alcohol, that he was 
unsteady on his feet or that his speech was slurred. 
Where such evidence is used to justify a dismissal, the court 
requires it to be reliable and convincing. In KOYINI and 
OTHERS v STRAND BOX (PTY) LTD21 � the court, after expressing
reservations about the credibility of the manager who had 
witnessed the alleged drunkenness, found that it had not been 
adequately proved. The employer had also tried to justify the 
dismissal on the ground that a rule, in the form of a 
regulation under the Factories Act, 22 demanded it. The court
rejected this, finding that the regulation not only made no 
mention of dismissal but also seemed to have been inapplicable 
because there was apparently no machinery in the vicinity other 
than a fire hose.23 
21. (1985)6 ILJ 450 at 468C - 4701.
22. Regulation C6 of the repealed Factories Act No. 28 of 191 8
rules inter alia:
(i) that no person shall consume intoxicating liquor whilst in
the vicinity of or whilst working on or near machinery; and
(ii) no person in a state of .intoxication shall enter or remain
or shall be permitted by the user to enter or to remain on
premises where machinery is used.
23. At 470 B.
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Similarly in MAWU AND ANOTHER v HENDLER AND HENDLER (PTY) 
LTD,24 the court found that there was not sufficient prima 
faci e evidence for issuing a warning for drunkenness in light 
of the fact that the employee I s explanation had been that he 
was assaulted while on his way to work. Erasmus AM said the 
employee might indeed have been 'incoherent or unsteady on his 
feet as a result of a blow, or blows on his head.125 It had
indeed been common cause that the employee had had some 
congealed blood on the side of his mouth which would have been 
in keeping with his version. 
Once the court is satisfied that drunkenness was proved, it 
takes several factors into account in deciding whether or not 
the dismissal was fair. In the case of FINCK AND ANOTHER v 
OHLSSONS CAPE BREWERIES26 for example, the employer cl aimed
that it was especially loath to tarnish its image in any way by 
having intoxicated employees seen to be handling its 
products.27 This, together with the fact that safety was 
extremely important due to the mechanised nature of the plant, 
added to an alleged problem with theft of liqour, led the court 
to decide the dismissal was fair. 
24. (1985)6 ILJ 362.
25. At 366 A-C.
26. (1985) ICD (1) 20.
27. At 21. Mention has also already been made of the existence of
the strict company rule prohibiting the consumption of alcohol.
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In ROSENBERG v MEGA PLASTICs28, the fact that the employee
was a driver in control of a heavy duty vehicle who had 
jeopardised the lives of other road users, as well as of the 
two loaders subordinate to him by drinking about three beers 
while making a delivery, was found to have justified the 
dismissal. 
In LoTTER v SOUTHERN ASSOCIATED MALTSTERS (PTY} LTD,29 the
employee had broken a strict company rule by drinking while on 
standby. The court took cognisance of how the rule appeared to 
be inconsistently applied to managers and artisans. It also 
took into account the fact that the employer had made alcohol 
freely available to the employees as well as the fact that the 
employee had only been on standby. All of these factors, the 
court held, made the dismissal unfair.30
(c) Sleeping on duty
Proof that the employee was sleeping is normally not a problem 
as the employee is almost always caught 'red- handed. 1 What 
must be considered, however, is the reason he puts forward as 
to why he was sleeping. 
28. (1984)5 ILJ 29 at 33 A-B.
29. (1988)9 ILJ 332.
30. At 335 J - 336 C.
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In SIBISI v GELVENOR TEXTILES (PTY) LTD.,31 an employee
charged with this offence said he had not been sleeping but had 
only sat down for a few minutes as a result of feeling nauseous 
and dizzy. At the enquiry, the employee could not explain why 
he had been found lying on cardboard sheets with a plastic 
pillow nor why he had not been found next to his machine. The 
court did not believe the employee 1 s version and because he had 
previously received a final warning, for the same offence, 
found the dismissal to be fair. Had the employee in this case 
merely had his head on his chest, the court 1s finding would 
undoubtedly have been different. The nature of the job would 
also be a factor to be taken into account. Where someone is 
employed as a security guard for example, the offence would 
have to be viewed more seriously. 
The offence in this country is one which lends itself to the 
raising of mitigating factors particularly in respect of Black 
employees. 
In many cases there may be very good reasons as to why an 
employee was sleeping on duty. Lack of sleep could very 
realistically be due to overcrowded or noisy living quarters, 
violence in a township or due to poor transport and inordinate 
periods of time spent getting to and from work and it would be 
unfair of an employer not to take such factors into account 
were they to be advanced. 
31. (1985)6 ILJ 122
- 75 -
( d) Negligence
Evidence of negligence in the performance of duties is usually 
not too difficult to prove since the negligence often 'speaks 
for itself 1 • 32 The employer must, however, be careful to 
consider all the facts. Where he does not do so, the court 
will come to the assistance of employees in finding that the 
negligence was not properly proved. Thus, in RAMPERSAD v BB 
BREAD, 33 where the employee, a driver - salesman was 
charged, sometime before he was dismissed, with having caused a 
vehicle's engine to seize by revving it excessively, the court 
took note of the employer's failure to consider other factors 
such as the car's poor case history and the fact that it was 
very old, and found that the negligence had not been 
conclusively proved. Although the employee had only been given 
a final warning for this alleged negligence, the employer had 
relied on it 34 in deciding subsequently that the employee 
should be dismissed for a 11 eged negligent driving. The 
employer had al so rel i ed on a tachograph to prove that the 
employee had been speeding and had relied on the evidence of a 
member of the public who alleged that he had been forced off 
the road by the employee. The member of the public had merely 
informed the employer of this 
32. As expressed by the maxim 'res ipsa loquitur'.
33. (1986)7 ILJ 367.
34. Even though the employee's appeal against the warning had not
been heard at the time of the subsequent enquiry.
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incident over the telephone and had not been present at the 
enqui ry35 • The court had no doubt that the employee had been
speeding and also concluded that he had 'in all possibility• 
36 been inconsiderate to other road users. But, since the 
afore-mentioned negligence had not been adequately proved, it 
ruled that the dismissal was not justified. 
Proving the alleged negligence properly will entail allowing 
the employee to challenge the allegations and to put forward 
any reason as to why the alleged behaviour might not amount to 
negligence. 
In KANTOLO & ANOTHER v SUPER RENT (CAPE) (PTY) LTD T/A 
CONNAUGHT MOTORS AND SUPER RENT TRUCK HIRE, 37 the empl ayer 
tried to impute negligence by saying that the employee 
concerned had usually carried a shoulder bag containing money 
and that he consequently had to I shoulder res pons i bi l i ty 1 38 
for any shortfall there may have been. A shortfall would 
automatically prove, according to the employer, that the 
employee had been either negligent or dishonest. The employee 
35. The employee did not deny the allegations at the enquiry,
thereby enabling the employer to avoid the necessity of
presenting the witness to allow his evidence to be challenged.
36. At 372C-D.
37. (1988) 9 ILJ 120 at 127G-l28.
38. At l28E-F.
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was not given an opportunity to challenge this assumption or to 
advance some other explanation as to how there may have been a 
shortfall. The employer had not even proved to the employee 
that there had been a shortfall and had refused to allow the 
employee to view the books which an accountant had allegedly 
found did not balance. The dismissal was accordingly held to 
be unfair. There was a similar problem in VAN ZYL v O'OKIEP 
COPPER CO LTD,39 a case involving a diesel mechanic who had
allegedly been negligent in causing damage to the gearbox of a 
piece of mining equipment. The court took the view that 
al though the employee's conduct may indeed have amounted to 
negligence, the fact that there was no proper hearing, which 
could have cl eared up some doubt as to whether or not the 
negligence had actually caused the damage in question, made the 
dismissal unfair.40 
If there is no doubt about the negligence it must be 
sufficiently gross to warrant the sanction of dismissal. 
NUM & ANOTHER v EAST RAND PROPRIETARY MINES LTD41 the failure
39. (1 983) 4 ILJ 125.
40. See at 127A-B and 135H.
In 
41. (1987) 8 ILJ 315. See, too, NAAWU v PRETORIA PRECISION
CASTINGS (PTY) LTD (1985)6 ILJ 369, where the court found that
the failure to hold a hearing may be excused in respect of the
consideration of guilt where there was no doubt about the
employee's negligence (at 379H). The court also found, though,
that the failure to hold a hearing in respect of the imposition
of a sanction, made the dismissal unfair and reinstated the
applicant notwithstanding having earlier concluded that the
negligence justified his dismissal (at 375F-G and 3760)1. See
the criticism of the decision in Brassey et al The New Labour
Law at 87-88.
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of the employee, who was a member of the mine's security 
personnel, to inform management of an impending hostel bar 
boycott was not considered to have constituted negligence which 
justified his dismissal. 
(e) Insubordination
Insubordination sometimes supplements the offence of a failure 
to obey a lawful instruction. When it does, it is secondary to 
the main offence and is considered as an aggravating factor. 
If the employee is dismissed, it will usually not be on account 
of the insubordination but for the main charge of failing to 
obey the i nstructi on42 • Where the offence is in respect of
insubordination alone, a single act of insubordination will 
seldom be sufficient to warrant dismissal unless, of course, it 
is a gross act. 
The question of what is gross and what is not has become a 
particularly interesting and relevant one in the changing 
socio-political climate which South Africa finds itself in at 
the moment. As a result of black employees becoming 
increasingly less subservient and more outspoken, white 
employers, unused to such behaviour, have generally tended to 
interpret this as a challenge to their authority and have often 
over-reacted, condemning it as insubordination. The fact that 
the majority of the court's presiding officers are fairly 
conservative white South Africans has further complicated 
matters. 
42. See CCAWUSA & ANOTHER v AERIAL KING SALES (1987) !CD (l) 345
for an example of a case where insubordination is coupled to
the failure to obey an instruction.
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True insubordination usually takes the form of an act by an 
employee which belittles someone in charge of him and this 
makes the offence difficult to prove since much depends on the 
intention of the employee and on how whatever he has done is 
interpreted by the person in charge. 
The difficulty is well reflected in the facts of NKALA v 
PINETOWN ENGINEERING FOUNDRY co. 43 There an employee was 
dismissed for allegedly putting a union sticker on a foreman's 
back. The court found that the act was no more than a 
'distasteful prank' which had unjustifiably been given a 
'sinister content' by the employer. The dismissal was 
consequently held to be unfair. 
In NUM & ANOTHER v ZINC CORPORATION OF S.A.,44 the alleged 
gross insubordination in question occurred during a strike. 
The employee who was a spokesman for the strikers, in response 
to being asked by a manager what his name was, suggested that 
the, latter look it up in a list of names lying on the desk 
between them. On being asked again, he repeated his 
suggestion. The employer made much of the fact that while the 
question had been phrased in Xhosa, the reply was in English, 
which it interpreted as a sign of marked disrespect. Adopting 
43. (1985) ICD (l) 45 at 46.
44. (1987) ICD (1) 380
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a typically conservative approach, Le Roux A.M. found the 
dismissal to have been justified in the circumstances.45 It 
is submitted that the court would almost certainly have come to 
a different conclusion had the parties both been white, where 
there would have been no elements of 'baaskap'. 
The court in FAWU AND ANOTHER v HARVESTIME CORPORATION (PTY} 
LTD46 drew an important and realistic distinction between the
role of shop stewards and that of ordinary employees. The 
alleged insubordination took the form of a shop steward asking 
a superior if he thought he was the 'fucking paymaster'. For 
this he was dismissed. In ruling that the behaviour did not 
amount to gross insubordination, the court found that an 
employee who was a shop steward had to be afforded more of an 
equivalent status with supervisors. He wore in effect, two 
hats - one as a shop steward and one as an employee, the former 
45. See, too, ROSTOLL EN 'N ANDER v LEEUPOORT MINERALE BRON (1987)
8 ILJ 366, where the employee, on being confronted by her
employer about several complaints clients had made, threw her
keys onto a counter, told him to do the work himself if he
wasn't happy and left the building, leaving him to carry out
her duties for the night. The court in this case decided that
the dismissal was fair even though no hearing had been held.
Compare this to the employee's complained of behaviour in
MAFALALA v DERBERS (PTY) LTD (1987) ICD (1) 627.
46. (1989) 10 ILJ 497.
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entitling him to relate to his seniors in a more relaxed 
fashion. In this particular case certain employees had had 
their pay tickets unreasonably withheld by the supervisor in 
question and it was this which had prompted the outburst. The 
employees had had good reason to be dissatisfied and had 
requested the second applicant in his capacity as chairman of 
the shop stewards to attend to the problem. 
In another case i nvo l vi ng a shop steward, TGWU & ANOTHER v 
INTERSTATE BUS LINES (PTY) LTD,47 the second applicant had 
been the subject of a disciplinary hearing which was 
considering an unrelated incident. During this hearing he had 
allegedly grabbed the chairman's notes and had run out of the 
enquiry with them. The following day he was dismissed for 
insubordination even though he had not been properly advised of 
this additional charge. Despite this and other procedural 
irregularities, the court found the dismissal to have been 
substantively fair. His behaviour, the court found, was 
inexcusable and had the effect of disregarding the respondent's 
authority and of making a mockery of the respondent I s 
disciplinary procedure.48 
47. (1988) 9 ILJ 877
48. AT 881 B-C
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(f} Dishonesty 
Dishonesty in the sphere of employment comes in many guises. 
It can include theft, fraud,49 the unauthorised removal of
company property50 and the disclosure of confidential
information51 • Such offences are seen in a serious light and
provided they are adequately proved, they generally make a 
dismissal justifiable. The standard of proof which the 
Industrial Court requires is the same as in the civil courts, 
namely that the offence is proved on a 'balance of 
probabilities•.52 The employer is never expected to prove his
49. See, FAWU v REYROLLE PARSONS OF S.A. (1986} 7 ILJ 509 and
MAKHATHINI & ANOTHER v UNIPLY (PTY} LTD (1985} 6 ILJ 315.
50. AMOS v STUTTAFORDS (1986} 7 ILJ 506. The phrasing of the 
offence in this form helps to overcome the ever-present 
technical difficulty of proving the intention to steal. 
51. See, for example, BISSESSOR v BEASTORES T/A GAME DISCOUNT WORLD
(1986} 7 ILJ 334 and WHITCUTT v COMPUTER DIAGNOSTICS AND
ENGINEERING (PTY} LTD (1987) 8 ILJ 356.
52. See, for example, MAHLANGU v CIM DELTAK (1986) 7 ILJ 346 at
357G; SIMONS v GRAND BAZAARS (1986) ICD (1) 311 at 312. Julian
Riekert Basic Employment Law (Juta & Co, 1986} at 78-79
explains the standard well when he says 1 • • •  if, in a
disciplinary enquiry, the evidence against the employee is
weightier and more convincing than the evidence in his favour,
disciplinary action will be justified.'
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case beyond all reasonable doubt, as a result of which an 
employee may be acquitted in a criminal court but may still be 
fairly dismissed on the same facts53 •
There must, however, be adequate proof of the offence. As 
Levy54 says,
'If the employer has based his evidence on suspicion, 
hearsay or security reports and there is no hard evidence, 
he is not entitled to say that a theft has occurred. He 
therefore has no justification to dismiss for theft.' 
Employees faced with this difficulty have gone to some lengths 
in trying to prove the offence of theft. In MAHLANGU v CIM 
DELTAK55, for example, the employer tried to use
lie-detectors. In considering what evidential weight should be 
given to such tests, the court examined what the position was 
in various foreign jurisdictions as well as in South African 
criminal and civil courts56 and concluded that findings based
on such tests could not be relied upon. 
53. See MOAHLODI v EAST RAND GOLD AND URANIUM CO LTD (1988) 9 ILJ
597 at 601B.
54. Andrew Levy Unfair Dismissal : A Guide for South African
Management (Divaris Stein, 1984) at 82.
55. (1986) 7 ILJ 346.
56. At 353A - 354D.
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In EAWTU & ANOTHER v THE PRODUCTIONS CASTING CO (PTY) L TD57,
the employer twice tried to get the court to accept the 
evidence of an allegedly frightened informer who had not given 
oral evidence at the disciplinary enquiry. The first attempt 
was made by way of an application in terms of S.1 7(ll)(a} after 
the parties' statements of case had been filed. The evidence 
was taken on commission in chambers but the presiding officer 
subsequently advised the parties that his taking the evidence 
in this manner 'in no way constituted a ruling as to the 
admissibility of such evidence' nor was it 'indicative of the 
weight to be attached thereto 158• During the Section 46(9)
proceedings, the employer made another application to have the 
witness's evidence heard in-camera. The presiding officer in 
those proceedings ruled that the evidence on commission was 
i nadmi ss i b 1 e because, inter a 1 i a, the section under which the 
application had been brought was not intended for such a 
procedure. 
In respect of the application to have the evidence heard 
in-camera, although he was mindful of the need for the 
Industrial Court not to allow the normal rules of procedure and 
evidence to prevent the establishment of truth and justice, he 
was wary of 'opening a Pandora's box to let elements of 
secrecy, covertness, prejudice and even malice enter the 
portals of an institution which, in the nature of things, would 
be ill-equipped to handle and control them' 59• 
57. (1988) 9 ILJ 702.
58. At 704E-F.
59. At 706F
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The presiding officer also seemed to indicate that the court 
would accept a lesser standard of proof than a 'balance of 
probabilities' in cases of misconduct, where the employer could 
show that a justifiable mistrust was 'counter-productive to his 
commercial activities or to the public interest 160 •
There has been varied success in the use of confessions or 
admi ssi ans in proving the occurrence of theft. In SIMONS v 
GRAND BAZAARs61, the court found that the alleged confessions 
were not true confessions 'as required by law•,62 and, since
there was no direct proof or corroborating evidence, decided 
that the dismissal was unfair. In other cases, however, the 
court has accepted confessions as being adequate proof of 
theft63• 
60. See at 708F-709B.
61. (1986} I CD ( l } 311.
62. At 311. See, too, the court's interesting disapproval of the
employer's failure to report alleged thefts to the police whom
were 'best qualified to conduct the required investigations.•
63. See HLALUTYANA v NABE BAZAAR (1987) !CD (1} 351 and FAWU & 
OTHERS v AMEENS FOOD PRODUCTS & BUTCHERY (1988) 9 ILJ 659 at 
670 E-F. The court in this case, though, decided that the 
dismissal was unfair because no proper enquiry had been held. 
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If the dishonesty is satisfactorily proved, dismissal will 
generally be justifiable. For example, in PILLAY v C.G. SMITH 
SUGAR LTD64 , the dismissal of an employee for. the theft of 
twenty litres of diesel fuel was held to be fair even though 
the employee had been with the employer for twenty two years. 
The presiding officers found that, 
'It would be incorrect for this court to set the precedent that 
an employee is entitiled to steal once from his employer before 
the latter is entitled to dismiss him.' 65
The employer must, however, ensure that he is consistent in his 
treatment of employees, for any inconsistency can cause the 
court to believe that the employer himself does not regard the 
offence as sufficiently serious to justify dismissa166 • 
64. (1985) 6 ILJ 530.
65. At 538H.
66. See FAWU & OTHERS v AME ENS FOOD PRODUCTS & BUTCHERY (l 988) 9
ILJ 659 at 671E-F and SIMONS v GRAND BAZAARS (1986) ICD (1) at
311 at 312.
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(g) Refusal to obey a lawful instruction
A refusal to obey an instruction which forms part of an 
employee's contracted obligations normally justifies dismissal, 
provided the refusal is wilful and serious and provided the 
instruction is lawful and reasonable. 
Proving the offence does not normally present too much of a 
problem. There is seldom any doubt about an instruction having 
been given or that there has been a wilful refusal to obey 
it67• It is also fairly simple to establish the lawfulness
of the instruction and if it is unlawful, it will obviously be 
unfair to dismiss an employee for a refusal to obey the 
instruction68 •
67. Although see the case of MAWU & OTHERS v TRANSVAAL PRESSED NUTS
(1988) 9 ILJ 129 at 137C-139I in which there was no allegation
of a refusal to carry out an instruction, but only 'that the
employee had been 'disinclined' to do so. The court noted
rather humorously that '(i)f mere disinclination is an offence,
then half the country's population would soon lose their jobs.'
(at 3811). See, too, NJAPHA v 0TH BEIER (1984) ICD (I) 44 in
which the alleged refusal to submit to a body search was found
to have been merely a refusal to empty out pockets and DREYER v
FRANZ FALKE TEXTILES (1985) 6 ILJ 223 at 229A-E where the court
found it unlikely that an order had been given.
68. See NAAWU v CHT MANUFACTURING CO (PTY} LTD 1984(5) ILJ 186 and
NUTW & OTHERS v JAGUAR SHOES (1986} 7 ILJ 359.
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What causes more difficulty is establishing whether the 
instruction or refusal was reasonable and assessing whether the 
refusal was sufficiently serious to justify dismissal. In 
deciding the reasonableness of the instruction, the court 
considers all the circumstances in which it was given. In 
BCAWU & ANOTHER v E ROGERS & C BUCHEL CC & ANOTHER69, for 
example, the court found that an instruction to a lorry driver 
to operate a loader machine with defective brakes and which he 
had had little experience in handling, was unreasonable. In 
MATSHOBA & OTHERS v FRY'S METALS (PTY) LTD, 7D the court found 
that a refusal to work overtime71 was not reasonable due to
the fact that the instruction had been given at short notice 
and the employees had made other plans and that the reason for 
the need to work the overtime had not been explained to them. 
Where the reason for the refusal is due to a concern for 
personal safety, dismissal will not be justified since such a 
refusal will generally be reasonable72 • 
69. (1 98 7) 8 ILJ 169.
70. (1 983) 4 ILJ 10 7.
71 • Al though in terms of the employees I contracts, the working of 
overtime was compulsory, in practice all that was required was 
for employees to give a reasonable explanation as to why they 
were unable to work. See, too, ESTERHUIZEN v PORTER SIGMA, 
PAARDEN EILAND (198 2) !CD (1) 19; MABIZELA v SIEMENS (1 984) !CD 
(1} 25 and CHETTY v RAYDEE (PTY} LTD T/A ST JAMES ACCOMMODATION 
( 1 988} 9 I LJ 318 in which the reasonableness or otherwise of 
instructions is considered. 
72. See SALDCDAWU & OTHERS v ADVANCE LAUNDRIES LTD T/A STORK
NAPKINS (1 985} 6 ILJ 544 and NUM & OTHERS v DRIEFONTEIN
CONSOLIDATED LTD (1 984} 5 ILJ 101.
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The refusal or failure to obey an instruction must be 
sufficiently serious to justify dismissal. Again the degree of 
seriousness must be assessed in light of all the circumstances 
and much depends on the implications of the refusal. 
Thus, in CCAWUSA & ANOTHER v OK BAZAARS 1929 Ltd73, where the
failure to obey an instruction to remove an electrical plug 
from a wall socket, appeared at first to be a 'trifling 
incident 1, 74 the court found that it was serious enough to 
warrant dismissal. The court came to this conclusion after 
taking into account the fact that the employer had made it a 
strict instruction following a disastrous fire in one of its 
branches which had been attributed to a short-circuit. 
Similarly in MAWU & NDEBELE v S A TRACTION MANUFACTURERs,75
the employer had experienced problems with shop stewards 
wandering around the premises. Instructions had been given 
that they were not to do so without the permission of their 
supervisors, but despite this, the second app 1 i cant had 
returned an oversupply of washers to another department without 
permission to do so. The court, in assessing the seriousness 
of the failure to obey the instruction, found that dismissal 
was the only option open to the employer who had to try to 1 
••• eliminate the undermining of its authority ••• the lack of 
which could have had a detrimental effect on employer/employee 
relationships•.76• 
73. {1986) 7 ILJ 438.
74. At 439G.
75. (1984) ICD (l) 31.
76. At 32.
- 90 -
(h) Assault
This offence can take the form of actual assault, intimidation, 
horseplay or abusive language. The misconduct can constitute a 
serious offence in any of these forms since it disrupts the 
running and well-being of the business. 
Proving the offence is often difficult especially in cases of 
alleged intimidation where there is usually an understandable 
reluctance to give evidence. In the other forms of the 
offence, there are also often disputes of fact due to 
exaggerations, and a lack of objectivity caused by heightened 
emotions. Where the alleged offence is not witnessed by other 
employees, one is faced with having one man's word against 
another's which is always a problem since, even if the assault 
is admitted, the defences raised are often either self-defence 
or provocation. 
The problems an employer faces in proving the offences are of 
course alleviated to a certain extent by the fact that the 
Industrial Court does not apply the same test of proof as that 
required by the Criminal Courts. It is sufficient if the 
offence is proved on a balance of probabilities and if the 
employer had a 'bona-fide and reasonable belief' 77 that the 
77. NUM & ANOTHER v WESTERN AREAS GOLD MINING CO. (1985) 6 ILJ 380
at 388E. See too at 388 F-H where the court endorsed the
'common sense' approach adopted by the employer who had taken
into account two previous assault charges even though the
employee had been acquitted on both occasions. See, too, NUM &
OTHERS v EAST RAND GOLD MINING AND URANIUM CO (1986) 7 ILJ 739
at 744H.
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employee is guilty. Once proved, the offence of assault 
normally justifies dismissal provided the employer is 
consistent in his treatment of the employees involved78 •
The substantive fairness of the dismissal will depend on a 
number of factors, including the degree of force used, whether 
the offence took pl ace on or off the premises and whether 
employees of a different level or race were involved. 
78. See, for example, NUM & ANOTHER v KLOOF GOLD MINING CO LTD
(1986) 7 ILJ 375 and NUM & OTHERS v DURBAN ROODEPOORT DEEP
(1987) 8 ILJ 156. Contrast, though, MAWU & MAGUBANE v SA
TRACTION MANUFACTURING (1984) ICD (1) 29 where the court found
that the employee who caused the fracas should be dismissed.
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In respect of the degree of force used, mere threats of assault 
are generally considered to be less serious than actual 
assaults79 • In cases of intimidation, on the other hand, 
which usually involve no more than threats, the offence is 
obviously more serious because of the reason for the 
intimidation which is generally to get other employees to take 
part in industrial action80 • 
79. In NTSHANGASE v ALUSAF (PTY} LTD (1984} 5 ILJ 336, Ehlers DP
(as he then was} said 'whether summary dismissal could be
justified where there had only been threats of assault appears
to be questionable.• (at 342B}
80. In most cases dealing with intimidation, the failure of the
courts to uphold the dismissals has been because the offence
has not been adequately proved and not because the offence was
considered insufficiently serious. See, for example, NUM &
OTHERS v TRANSVAAL NAVIGATION COLLIERIES & ESTATE CO (l 986} 7
ILJ 393; SAAWU & OTHERS v DORBYL AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS (PTY} LTD
(1987} ICD (1) 520; KEBENI & OTHERS v CEMENTILE PRODUCTS CISKEI
( PTY} LTD & ANOTHER ( 1987} 8 I LJ 442 and MAWU & OTHERS v
TRANSVAAL PRESSED NUTS BOLTS AND RIVETS (PTY) LTD (1988) 9 ILJ
129 at 134A - l35E. See, too, SAAWU and ANOTHER v EAST LONDON
MUNICIPALITY, an unreported judgement dated 7 .12.87, in which
the court upheld the dismissal.
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In considering cases of assault off company premises, the court 
takes into account whether the assault did in fact take place 
off company premises81 and, if it did, how the employment 
relationship is nevertheless affected. Thus, in VAN ZYL v 
DUVHA OPENCAST SERVICES (PTY) L TD82, al though the assault was 
technically off company premises, the fact that the assaulted 
employee was the applicant's supervisor, led the court to 
decide that the dismissal of the subordinate was fair. 
The fact that the assault does take pl ace off the premises 
exacerbates the problem of proof which usually results in the 
employer seldom taking action in such cases. 
Where assaults are made on superiors by their subordinates, the 
court sees it as an aggravating factor.83 Similarly, 
81 . See, for example, NUM AND OTHERS v EAST RAND GOLD AND URANIUM 
CO (1 986) 7 ILJ 739, where the court found that employees who 
assaulted fellow-employees on a company-owned bus conveying 
them home were 'still within the scope of their employment'. 
(at 744 B-F) The court also made it clear that a dismissal 
could be justified where the assault took place outside the 
scope of employment, and referred with approval to English law 
which adopts the same approach (at 743 D-H). 
82. (1988) 9 ILJ 904.
83. See, for example, NTSHANGASE v ALUSAF (PTY) LTD (1984) 5 ILJ
336 at 342C; MAWU and OTHERS v FERALLOYS (l 987) 8 I LJ 1 24 at
137C and the DUHVA case referred to in the above footnote.
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assaults on members of another racial group are also viewed 
more seriously. The court considers the wider implications of 
such an assault including the importance of having good race 
relations in the present climate of the country. It takes into 
account as well the greater chance which assaults of this 
nature have of causing industrial unrest84• The court views
inter-racial friction in such a serious light that it has even 
upheld dismissals for racially abusive language. In 
BEZUIDENHOUT v AFRICAN PRODUCTS (PTY) LTD, 85 a white employee 
was dismissed for crossing out the word 'black', referring to a 
language on a vacancy notice, and replacing it with the word 
1 kaffir 1 , which had resulted in a work-stoppage. The court 
found his dismissal to have been fair. 
84. See KNOETZE v RUSTENBURG PLATINUM MINES (1984) ICD (l ) 23;
SAYSVNU EN 'N ANDER v ASEA ELECTRIC SA (PTY) LTD (1988) 9 ILJ
463 and WAHL V AECI LTD (1983) 4 ILJ 298.
85. An unreported judgement dated 23.3.87 (Case No. NH 13/2/1714).
See, too, SWANEPOEL v AECI Ltd (1984) 5 ILJ 41 and UAMAWU AND
OTHERS v FODENS (SA) (PTY) Ltd (1983) 4 ILJ 212 at 235A where
the court ruled it to be an unfair labour practice for an
employer not to stop its managers and employees from using the
word 1 kaffir 1 • 
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INCOMPATIBILITY 
The court has relatively recently recognised that dismissal can be 
justified on the grounds of incompatibility. This separate category 
was first established in the case of STEVENSON v STERNS JEWELLERS 
( PTY) Ltd, 86 where the court di sti ngu i shed it from misconduct and
accepted that there had been fairly serious friction between the 
applicant, who had been appointed as Managing Di rector three weeks 
prior to his dismissal, and the respondent's Chainnan and managers. 
This had apparently resulted from an 'incompatibility in their 
managerial philosophy and style.87 
That there had been friction was cofflllon cause although the applicant 
felt that the reason for this was that he was brought in as a 'new 
broom' who was expected to change the management structure and 
certain methods of operation. It was consequently inevitable that 
he would cause offence to some employees. The court accepted, 
however, that he had probably been warned to change his approach and 
when he did not do so, the respondent's action in the circumstances 
was not unfair. 
86. (1986) 7 ILJ 318. In an earlier case, RHODES v SA BIAS BINDING
MANUFACTURERS (1985) 6 ILJ 106, the employee had been dismissed
because, it was alleged, he had not 'fitted into the system of
work' but it is not clear from the judgement what exactly was
meant by this and whether the reason for the dismissal was true
i ncompati bi 1 i ty.
87. In the terms of the respondent's counsel's submissions at 322 I.
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In a further case88 where this separate category of 
incompatibility was recognised, the court found that the employer 
had failed to prove that the employee was incompatible. In order to 
resolve certain difficulties which had arisen between himself and 
another employee whose duties appeared to have overlapped with his, 
the applicant had accepted a revised job description and was 
subsequently assured that his position was secure. The court found 
that following this and prior to his dismissal, the company had not 
proved that he had been warned about any alleged incompatibility or 
that his conduct was unacceptable to other employees. It is 
submitted that the court would probably have upheld the dismissal if 
it was proved that he had been warned. 
It is cl ear from the facts of G v K89 that the category has its
limits. In this case, a female employee who had had an affair with 
a senior director was dismissed when the affair came to an end. In 
attempting to justify the dismissal, the respondent claimed that she 
worked 'too independently' and that she had an unwarranted 'air of 
superiority'. It had also tried to argue that its clients would be 
offended by her continued presence as they were 'conservative people 
with conservative moral views'. 
88. LARCOMBE v NATAL NYLON INDUSTRIES {PTY) LTD, PIETERMARITZBURG
(1986} 7 ILJ 326.
89. (1988) 9 ILJ 314.
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It was clear to the court, however, .that the 'root cause' of the 
dismissal was the affair and the decision to terminate her 
employment was to spare the senior director and his family any 
embarrassment. This was obviously unfair and the court held that to 
find otherwise would 1• • •  be tantamount to rendering every female 
employee vulnerable and expendable once she had slept or cavorted 
with her employer.' 90 
One of the factors which the court took into account in deciding the 
dismissal was unfair, was that the parties had apparently worked out 
a solution two weeks prior to her dismissal which would have enabled 
her to stay on. 91 This apparently convi need the court that the 
parties could not have been so incompatible that dismissal was 
justified. 
It is also clear that where a supervisor or manager has problems 
with his inter-personal relations with employees under his control 
because, for example, they belong to another race group, his 
dismissal would be fair where it is obvious that he would not be 
able to alter his prejudices.92 
90. At 316J.
91. At 315J - 316A.
92. See, for examp 1 e, ERASMUS v BB BREAD LTD (1987) 8 I LJ 537 at
5448-E.
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INCAPACITY 
An employer may, in certain circumstances, dismiss an employee for 
absence due to ill-health or injury. As already mentioned, his 
first task will be to establish whether the employee is truly 
incapable of doing the work he was employed to do or whether he is 
merely a malingerer. If the latter is the case it must be treated 
as misconduct. Proving the incapacity may involve having the 
employee examined by one or more medical practitioners including one 
of his own choice if he is dissatisfied with the findings of those 
to whom he has been referred. 
Once the incapacity is established, the substantive fairness of the 
di smi ssa l would depend on a number of factors. The severity and 
nature of the incapacity and the employee's prognosis would be 
important. Where the employee's condition makes him incapable of 
doing his normal duties but it is not so serious as to prevent him 
from doing any other job which may be available, it would be unfair 
of the employer to dismiss him instead of offering him the 
alternative position.93 
93. See, for example, DLOKWENI v A (1984) ICD (l) 16 in which the
court found the dismissal of a driver, who was no longer able
to drive due to an in operable cataract in his eye, to have
been unfair because the employer did not consider the
alternative of employing him as a car-washer. Where the injury
or ill-health is caused by the employee's job, it could be
argued that there would be more of an obligation on the
employer to find him an alternative position.
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The fairness of a dismissal would depend on the duration and 
frequency of the employee's past absence and the expected 
frequency of his future absence. It would al so depend on how 
feasible it is for the employer to do \'lithout his services. 
The size of the business and the employee's dispensability will 
obviously also have a bearing on these considerations.94
While an employer is expected to exercise a reasonable degree 
of patience in providing the employee an opportunity to return 
to his duties, the court will take into account the employee's 
attempts to restore his condition to normal. Thus, in NUM AND 
ANOTHER v THE VRYHEID RAILWAY COAL AND IRON CO LTD, 95 where 
an underground worker had, due to an ear infection, become 
partially deaf thereby endangering his own safety as well as 
the safety of other employees, the court upheld his dismissal 
which had taken place some four months after he had developed 
the infection. 96 
In coming to this finding, the court took into account the 
unreasonable attitude of the employee who had rejected remedial 
treatment offered by the employer and had apparently made no 
attempt to arrange for treatment himself. From this, it also 
appears as if an empl ayer may be expected to provide whatever 
assistance he can to enable the employee to return to work and 
where such assistance is lacking it may affect the fairness of 
the dismissal. 
94 See the article 'Really Sick or Only Tired' in Employment Law 
Vol 2 No. 3 AT 42. 
95. (1986) 7 ILJ 587. See at 597 A-H.
96. See at 595 E-F and 597 E-F where the court referred approvingly
to the employer's patient handling of the matter.
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INCOMPETENCE 
An employer is expected to verify an employee's competence prior to 
his being engaged on a permanent basis. This is done during the 
process of selection when the 
checked by means of tests, 
testimonials. 
employee I s competence is rigorously 
interviews and the perusal of 
Where the employer is still not assured of the employee's competence 
after such a process, he may decide to offer him employment on a 
trial or probationary basis. An employment contract subject to such 
a condition is a good idea from the employer's point of view since 
it enables him to see for himself whether the employee can perform 
according to the required level of competence and whether he is 
capable of doing so over a reasonable period of time. If, at the 
end of the period,97 he decides not to offer the employee
permanent employment, he can do so without the risk of a claim of 
unfair dismissai.98 
97. In BAWU & OTHERS v ONE RANDER STEAK HOUSE (1988) 9 ILJ 326,
the court went even further when it found that the termination
of the contract could take pl ace before the end of the 
probationary period provided the employee was given the 
necessary notice. 
98. The 1988 Amendments to the Labour Relations Act have now
effectively entrenched probationary periods in almost all 
employment contracts by providing that the termination of a 
contract in the first six months of employment cannot be an 
unfair labour practice provided, in dismissals 'by reason of 
any disciplinary action', there is a fair procedure. In 
terminations 'on grounds other than disciplinary action', 
there will be no unfair labour practice as long as there is 
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Where the employee later proves to be less competent than initially 
believed, the employer is not expected to continue employing him 
indefinitely although it will be more difficult for him to prove the 
employee's incompetence. 
The substantive fairness of a dismissal for incompetence is 
inextricably linked to its procedural fairness. Since, before 
dismissal for this reason can ever be substantively fair, the 
employee must have been warned about the areas in which his 
performance was below standard and of the possible consequences in 
the event of no improvement. This naturally also entails affording 
him an opportunity within which to improve,99 as well as enabling 
him to attend a hearing at which any reason for the sub-standard 
performance may be advanced. 
98. (contd) compliance with 'any applicable agreement, wage
regulating measure or contract of service'. See clauses (a)(i)
and (b)(i) of the definition of an unfair labour practice as
amended by s I(h) of Act No. 83 of 1988.
99. In respect of the need to give an opportunity to improve
performance, our court has often referred with approval to the
English case of JAMES v WALTHAM HOLY CROSS URBAN DISTRICT
COUNCIL 1973 ICR 398 which contained the following passage: 'An
employer should be very slow to dismiss upon the grounds that
the employee is incapable of performing the work which he is
employed to do without first telling the employee of the
respects in which he is failing to do his job adequately,
warning him of the possibilities or likelihood of dismissal on
this ground and giving him an opportunity of improving his
performance'. See STEVENSON v STERNS JEWELLERS (PTY) LTD
(1986) 7 ILJ 318 AT 324F-I; MADAY! v TIMPSON BATA (PTY) LTD
(1987) 8 ILJ 494 AT 497 B-D and SAAWU & OTHERS v ROQUE t/a
TECHNIMOULD ICD 321.
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Even where there is no doubt about an employee I s work being below 
standard, his dismissal would nevertheless be unfair where it could 
be shown, for example, that any personal problem he was having were 
not taken into account. His dismissal would similiarly be unfair if 
the poor performance was not entirely his fault but was due to, for 
instance, improper training or bad tools supplied by the employer. 
In such circumstances, the employer would be under an obligation to 
consider the reason carefully and help to rectify the cause of the 
problem before any decision to dismiss could be fair.
100
Our court has unfortunately failed to provide consistent guidelines 
on this ground of dismissal. 
In one of the first cases to come before the court in which alleged 
incompetence was involved, the court held that it would have 
expected the employee to
101 have been apprised of the the fact
that he did not fit into the respondent 
I s system in an effort to 
afford him the opportunity to improve prior to his employment being 
terminated.102 In deciding that the dismissal was unfair, the 
court took into account that the employer did not indicate anything 
100. BCAWU & ANOTHER v WEST RAND BRICK WORKS (PTY) LTD (1984)5 ILJ
69 provides rather questionable authority for the view that the
employer is obliged to do no more than offer to retrain the
employee and where this is refused, his subsequent dismissal
would not be unfair.
1 01. RHODES v SA BIAS BINDING MANUFACTURERS (PTY) LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 
l 06.
1 02. AT 120 E - F. 
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specific as constituting a deficiency in the employee's 
performance.103 It al so considered, as proof of reasonable
competence, the fact that the employee had been employed in a 
similar position by his previous employer for 28 years. 
The need for a system of warnings and an opportunity to improve was 
again recognised in MHLONGO v S A FABRICS LTDl04 where the
employee, after having received three warnings and being given a 
hearing, was found to have been fairly dismissed. 
In NODLELE v MOUNT NELSON HOTEL and ANOTHER, 105 although it was
clear that the employee had been warned about his poor performance, 
the dismissal was hel d to be unfair because he had not been given a 
hearing. Similiarly, in SAAWU and OTHERS v ROQUE t/a 
TECHNIMOULo,106 despite alleged counselling and warnings, the
court found that the dismissal was unfair as there had been no 
hearing.107 
103. AT 120 F - G. See, too, GWU and ANOTHER v DORBYL MARINE (PTY)
LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 52, where the fact that an employee had been
employed for 6 years was an indication to the court that he was
not incompetent.
104. (1985) 6 ILJ 248
105. (1984) 5 ILJ 216
106. (1986) ICD (1) 321
107. The court was also apparently not satisfied that the warnings,
which were supposed to have been written on the empl oyees'
clock cards, were indeed given. See, too, FBWU & ANOTHER v
EAST RAND BOTTLING CO. (PTY) LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 231, where the
failure to hold a hearing rendered the dismissal unfair.
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In ZUNGU v STRIP AND GASKET INDUSTRIES, l08 on the other hand, the 
court suprisingly found that no hearing was necessary and even 
considered it ' ••• difficult to envisage what form of enquiry could 
be undertaken where the unsatisfactory nature of the applicant I s 
work over several months, without improvement despite warnings, had 
led the employer to the conclusion that the applicant's services can 
no longer be retained 1 •109 
This view was also referred to and, unfortunately, followed in 
MADAY! v TIMPSON BATA (PTY) LTD.llO Also, in BAWU and OTHERS v
ONE RANDER STEAK HOUSE, ll l the court found that if the dismissal 
of an employee on probation was substantively fair, there would be 
no obligation on the employer to hold a hearing.112• The finding 
is anomalous for without a hearing, both the proof of the offence 
and the fairness of the decision are always open to some doubt. 
l 08. (1986) 7 ILJ 747
109. AT 749 B - C.
110. (1987) 8 ILJ 494 AT 497 D - H.
111. (1988) 9 ILJ 326.
112. In terms of the recent amendments to the Act, referred to
above, this decision would probably no longer be correct. Now
even probationary dismissals, for disciplinary reasons, must
take place in compliance with a fair procedure.
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CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL 
The term unfair di smi ssa l al so encompasses the concept of 
constructive dismissal whereby the actions of the employer, either 
those which inadvertently repudiate implied terms of the contract 
making continued employment intolerable or those by which the 
employer intentionally repudiates any express terms of the contract, 
amount to the virtual dismissal of the employee. 
An inadvertent repudiation could arise, for example, where an 
employer refuses to put a stop to the sexual harrassment of a female 
employee despite her complaints. Such refusal, it could be argued, 
would be a breach of an implied term of the employment contract, 
namely that an employee could expect to work without being harassed 
by fellow employees. It would make the female employees situation 
intolerable and her refusal to continue working under such 
conditions would be understandable. The use of vulgar language in 
the presence of female employees who had made it clear that they did 
not approve of such languages could similarly amount to a 
repudiation of an implied term of the contract. It would obviously 
depend on the circumstances as to whether or not certain terms could 
be said to be implied and, if this was alleged, whether this was 
reasonable. A male employee in an all-male environment in, say, a 
brick factory could hardly claim that that it was an implied term of 
his contract that he would not have to be exposed to vulgar 
language. The use of such language, one would think, would almost 
be a requirement in these circumstances! The use of abusive 
language, on the other hand, would not have to be tolerated and all 
employees could claim that it was an implied term of their contracts 
that they would not be verbally abused. 
Where the empl ayer is guilty of repudiating an express term of the 
contract, the matter is more simple. If an employer failed to pay 
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wages, for example, he could hardly expect his employees to remain 
in his employ and his action would clearly be tantamount to 
dismissing them.113 An employer who failed to take the necessary 
precautions to protect his employees would similarly be seen to have 
constructively dismissed them, particularly where it had been 
brought to his attention that they were unhappy about the safety of 
their working conditions.114
113. Even partial non-payment can amount to constructive dismissal.
See, for example, the case of SMALL & OTHERS v NOELLA CREATIONS
(PTY} LTD (1986} 7 ILJ 614 where the employer had made
deductions from employees I remuneration to make up for stock
shortages. The employees decided to resign rather than
continue working under such con di ti ons and were subsequently
reinstated by the court.
114. The point is well illustrated in the English case of KEYS v
SHOEFAYRE LTD (1978} I.R.L.R. 476 in which the employer 1s
failure to protect his emp 1 oyees thereby exposing them to an
unnecessary high risk of robberies which had led to the
resignation of the applicant, was seen as a fundamental breach
of the contract. See, too, the cases referred to at n 72 in
which employees were dismissed for failing to carry out
instructions jeopardizing their safety. Contrast this with
BCAWU & OTHERS v JOHNSON TILES (PTY} LTD (1985} 6 ILJ 210 AT
218 D-E and 219 I.
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A further example of a repudiation of express terms of contract 
which amounts to constructive dismissal arises in cases where an 
employer insists on altering the contractual nature of an employee's 
job without his consent and without good reason.115 In NTULI v 
NATAL OVERALL MANUFACTURING co,116 a security guard had been 
instructed to carry out duties of an allegedly inferior and 
degrading nature as a result, she claimed, of being involved in 
certain union activities. She did the job for a week under protest 
and in the hope her employer would rectify the position when she 
refused to continue carrying out the duties and returned instead to 
her old job which she was contractually obliged to do, she was 
dismissed. The Industrial Court cited with approval SMITH v CYCLE & 
MOTOR TRADE SUPPLY co.117 in which it had been held that an
employee, who is employed to perform certain agreed duties and is 
115. Where there is a valid reason for the alteration and it is
offered, for example, as an alternative to retrenchment, the
situation would clearly be different.
116. (1984) I CD. ( l ) 4 7
117. 1922 TPD 324. The case is also referred to in HALGREEN v NATAL
BUILDING SOCIETY (1986) 7 ILJ 769 AT 775 I as authority for the
existence of the concept of constructive dismissal in our law.
In this case, however, the court found that the applicant had
failed to prove an attempt by the respondent to reduce his
status.
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then ordered to carry out other duties of a more menial nature, 
could be humiliated by such action which would in some circumstances 
be tantamount to dismissal. The applicant was accordingly found to 
have been unfairly treated and she was reinstated. Had she not been 
dismissed and had she instead resigned, the court would presumably 
have applied the same principle and would have found that she had no 
reasonable option other than to resign. The emloyer's insistence 
that she do the more menial work would thus have amounted to her 
constructive dismissal. 118
118. See, however, the circumstances surrounding the third
applicant's dismissal in MAWU & OTHERS v TRANSVAAL PRESSED
NUTS, BOLTS & RI VETS (PTY} LTD (1988} 9 ILJ 129 AT 137-139 over
his alleged inability to carry out the additional duties of a
fellow employees who was on strike. The court rather
surprisingly did not even query the fairness of these
instructions and the possibility of constructive dismissal was
not discussed at all. See further S Anderman The Law of Unfair
Dismissal (Butterworths, 1985} AT 62 ff; T Poolman Principles
of Unfair Labour Practice (Juta & Co, 1985) AT 158-9; Cameron
et al The New Labour Relations Act (Juta & Co, 1989) AT 110 and
144 and GWALA v QUALITY PIK & PAK (1988} 9 ILJ 914.
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CHAPTER 6 
REINSTATEMENT AS A REMEDY 
We have seen that the Industrial Court has established some fairly 
consistent guidelines in respect of what is required in order to be 
procedurally and substantively fair and in doing so it has 
successfully managed to restrict many employers from terminating 
contracts of employment arbi tari ly. What happens though when the 
guidelines are not followed, when employees are dismissed unfairly? 
What remedy do they have to rectify this unfairness? In this 
chapter we shal 1 focus on the remedy of reinstatement which is the 
most meaningful method of protecting job security. 
Until fairly recently, the ordinary courts in South Africa refused 
to grant the remedy of specific performance in contracts of 
employment.1 For more than fifty years, the view of INNES CJ in 
the Appellate Division case of SCHIERHOUT v THE MINISTER OF 
JUSTICE, 2 
11Now it is a well established rule of English law that the 
only remedy open to an ordinary servant who has been 
wrongfully dismissed is an action for damages. 113 
l. See BLISMAS v DARDAGAN 1951 (1} SA 140 AT 148H; ROBERTS
CONSTRUCTION CO LTD v VERHOEF 1952 (2} SA 300 AT 305A; MYERS v
ABRAMSON 1952 (3) SA 121 AT 125D; POUGNET v RAMLAKAN 1961 (2)
SA 163; NGWENYA v NATALSPRUIT BANTU SCHOOL BOARD 1965 (l} SA
692; GRUNDLING v BEYERS 1967 ( 2} SA 131 and MABASO v NEL I S
MELKERY (Pty) Ltd 1979 (4} SA 358.
2. 1926 A.D. 99
3. AT 107
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was referred to by the courts in refusing to grant the remedy. 4 
Schierhout, of course, was not an ordinary servant. He was a civil 
servant whose employment was governed by the relevant statute. And 
therefore the above-mentioned dictum, so faith fully foll owed by our 
courts for so long without question, was obiter and should have had 
little effect on subsequent cases dealing with ordinary common law 
employees. 
The Roman-Dutch writers seemed to support the principle of specific 
performance but only as far as the payment of wages was concerned5
4. Prior to this, the same view had been taken. See, for example,
INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS LTD v ROBERTSON 1920 CTR
355; FARRINGTON v ARKIN 1921 CPD 268 at 289; HUNT v E.P.
BOA TI NG CO 1883-4 EDC l 2 and DENNY v S .A. LOAN CO. LIMITED
1883-4 EDC 47.
5. See, for example, Voet ad Pandectas 19.2.27 and Lee in his
translation of Grotius' Jurisprudence of Holland where, at 391
paragraph 13, he says 'a person who dismisses a servant within
the period of service without 1 awful reason must pay the full
wage.'
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and not in the form of reinstatement. 6 In SPENCER v GOSTELOW, 7
however, Innes CJ questioned the weight which could be attached to 
these authorities as they were not based on any general principle of 
law but on the legislation, in the form of ordinances and general 
1 placaats 1 which, he held,8 never formed part of our law.
The courts in South Africa therefore foll owed the approach adopted 
by English Law. 9 Al though the English Equity Courts at one stage
issued decrees of specific performance, lO this practice was not
followed. 
6. Although DE VILLIERS CJ in BASSARAMAOOO v MORRIS 6 SC 28 relied
on the above-mentioned text of VOET and VAN LEEUWEN I S Censura
Forensis 1.4.22 para 11 as authorities for the master's right
to force the servant to render the services owed, an order of
this nature was never made in favour of an employee. See
NGWENYA v NATALSPRUIT BANTU SCHOOL BOARD 1965 (1) SA 692 at
696, where Dowling J felt himself bound by the decision in
SCHIERHOUT to disregard the principle set out by Grotius
referred to in the footnote above.
7. 1920 AD 617 AT 628.
8. AT 631.
9. 'It may be taken that South African practice inrregard to the
remedy of an ordinary servant for wrongful di smi ssa 1 is the
same as the practice of the courts in England,' per INNES CJ in
SCHIERHOUT v THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE 1926 AD 99 at 108.
10. See BALL v COGGS (1710) 1 Bro Parl CAS 140 (HL) and EAST INDIA
COMPANY v VINCENT (1740) 2 ATK 83 both of which cases are cited
by M.S.M. Brassey in his excellent article 'Specific
Performance - A New Stage For Labour I s Lost Love 1 (1981) 2 ILJ
57 AT 57.
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A number of reasons have been advanced why an order of specific 
performance should not be granted in employment contracts. 
The only reason based on legal principles is that known as the 
doctrine of automatic termination. According to the theory of 
"automatic termination", a breach or repudiation of an employment 
contract automatically terminates it, making it impossible for the 
non-defaulting party to enforce. 11
The doctrine was finally rejected by the Appellate Division in 
STEWART WRIGHTSON (PTY) LTD v THORPE,12 when it ruled that a 
breach of an employment contract, like any other contract, entitled 
the non-defaulting party the choice of either enforcing or 
terminating it13 •
The other reason often advanced, apart from the above, is based on 
personal factors. How, the argument goes, can a man be expected to 
employ someone in whom he no longer has any trust or confidence?14
11. See GRACIE v HULL BLYTHE AND CO. (SA) LTD 1931 CPD 539; ROGERS 
v DURBAN CORPORATION 1950 (1) SA 65 AND NGWENYA v NATALSPRUIT 
BANTU SCHOOL BOARD 1965 (1) SA 692. 
12. 1977 (2) SA 943 (A) AT 952. 
13 . The court referred to VENTER v LIVNI 1950 (l) SA 524 and MYERS 
v ABRAMSON 1952 (3) SA 121 in reaching this finding. 
14. Allied to this is the argument that the employee does not
usually want reinstatement. While there may be some substance
to this in other countries, it would hardly ever be true in
South Africa where employment is so rife, particularly in
respect of unskilled employees.
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This was the basis of the above-mentioned view in SCHIERHOUT'S case 
as well as of the finding in POUGNET v RAMLAKAN15 • The question
of the employer's confidence in the employee in the latter case was 
seen as the decisive factor against an order of specific 
performance. 16
The personal nature of the employment contract and the emphasis 
placed on trust and confidence has been exaggerated. There are many 
occasions when such factors, due to the size of the operation, the 
level of the employee and the nature of the offence, really have no 
bearing on the question of whether the employee should be reinstated 
or not. At one time they may indeed have been relevant but they are 
generally no longer so, particularly in large companies where there 
is always the alternative of transferring the employee. The number 
of employees in such organisations makes it difficult for the court 
to continue to be mindful of the employer's trust because there will 
inevitably be some employees whom he will either not know at all or 
in whom he will have no confidence. 
Another reason given for not granting specific performance is that 
such an order would be contrary to the rule of mutuality which 
requires that no order can be made against the employer if it cannot 
15. 1961 (2) SA 163.
16. The court found that this would be the case even where the
employer and employee would not come into contact since the
employer would still be aware that in his employ was a man in
whom he had lost confidence (AT l66F and 167H).
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be made against the employee. Since courts would not consider 
ordering an employee to work for a certain employer against his 
wishes, 17 the rule prevents them from making the order in favour 
of the employee.18 
A reason which, though never relied upon by our courts, has been 
considered19 is that an order of specific performance is not
necessary because an award of damages would be a sufficient remedy. 
The high rate of unemployment alone enables an appreciation of the 
lack of substance in this argument in South Africa today. We have 
also seen that the amount of a damages award is negligible in 
comparison to the value of a lifetime of income. 
With this fairly imposing 1 ist of reasons against the granting of 
specific performance in employment contracts, how did our courts get 
around them to alleviate the devastating effect which this refusal 
had in practice? 
17. As O KAHN-FREUND says in 'Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law'
( 1974) 37 MLR l AT (24), such an order would 'savour of
compulsory labour.'
18. See the recognition given to the reason in SCHIERHOUT v THE
MINISTER OF JUSTICE 1 926 AD 99 AT l 07 and MYERS v ABRAMSON 1952
( 3} SA 121 AT ( 127} where the court held that a 1 though there
was no general bar to specific performance, it could not be
granted in that case since it would not be in accordance with
the rule of mutuality in that it was too late for the servant
to perform his share of the bargain.
19. See FARMERS' CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY v BERRY 1 912 AD 319.
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Firstly, a distinction was made between ordinary employees who were 
employed under common law and statutory employees whose condi ti ans 
of service were governed by statute. Where the latter type of 
employee was dismissed in contravention of the provisions of the 
particular statute regulating his employment, the courts declared 
the dismissal a nullity and ordered it to be set aside,20 the 
effect of which was that the employer had to fulfill his duties in 
terms of the contract. The employer would thus not have to 
reinstate the employee physically but he had to pay him his wages as 
long as the employee tendered his services. 
In some cases, the courts went so far as to order rei nstatement21
although their ability to make such orders seems doubtful. In terms 
of an employment contract, the employer generally has no duty to 
provide work for the employee - he only has a duty to pay him.22 
20. See FARMERS' CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY v BERRY 1 91 2 AD 319;
GUILDFORD v MINISTER OF RAILWAYS AND HARBOURS and UNION
GOVERNMENT 1920 CPD 606; SCHIERHOUT v MINISTER OF JUSTICE
1926 AD 99; BRAMDAW v UN ION GOVERNMENT 1931 NLR 57;
ADMINISTRATOR, CAPE PROVINCE v XABANISA 1 940 EDL 198 AND
MPHELENE v MINISTER OF NATIVE AFFAIRS 1954 (4) SA 445.
21 . See ROGERS v DURBAN CORPORATION 1950 (l) SA 65; VAN COLLER v 
THE ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSVAAL 1960 (l) SA 110 AND SOMERS v 
DIRECTOR OF INDIAN EDUCATION 1979 (4) SA 713. 
22. See ETIENNE MUREINIK 'Invalid Dismissals : Reinstatement and
Other Remedies' (1980) l ILJ 41 AT 44. The nature of the
employment could, however, imply a duty to provide work. The
employee may, for example, be a salesman who would have to work
in order to earn a commission.
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The statutory employee thus had a remedy which, though it was not 
true specific performance, was tantamount to it. In 1937 a limited 
version of this remedy became available to ordinary employees. 
Innes CJ in SCHIERHOUT had distinguished between Crown, civil and 
ordinary servants. He pl aced civil servants midway between Crown 
servants, who could be dismissed at pleasure, and ordinary servants, 
whose length of service was governed by contract. The statutory 
protection given to civil servants, he said, was to restrict 'the 
power of the crown to dismiss its servants at pleasure 123• This
protection consisted of l egi sl ati on which entrenched the procedure 
by which he was to be dismissed. In 1937, the Industrial 
Conciliation Act24 provided protection for employees, who were in
all other respects ordinary employees, when the reason for their 
dismissal was trade union activity. 25 A dismissal for this reason 
could be nullified in the same way as a dismissal in breach of any 
regulated procedures could be. This enabled a full bench of the 
Transvaal Provincial Division26 in ROOIBERG MINERALS DEVELOPMENT
CO. LTD v DU TOIT, to hold that a dismissal in contravention of the 
section was void and had not ended the contract. 
23. AT 108
24 . No. 36 OF 1937 
25. In terms of S66 (1 ) ( c)
26. 1953 (2) SA 505.
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Although this judgement lasted for more than twenty years, the court 
in KUBHEKA v IMEXTRA (PTY) LTD27 managed to destroy any of the 
benefit which had been derived from it. In this case, a single 
judge sitting in the same province ruled that a civil court had no 
jurisdiction either to reinstate workers or to declare their 
dismissals void, since the relevant Act28 only allowed the
criminal court to order the reinstatement of an employee once it had 
found the employer guilty of victimization. 
As it happened, however, this unfortunate judgement was a relatively 
minor stumbling block in the way of the many attempts which were 
made to ensure that employees who were wrongfully dismissed would be 
granted the remedy of specific performance. We 
how STEWART WRIGHTSON29 finally overturned 
have al ready seen 
the doctrine of 
automatic termination by holding that the general rule, that a party 
to a contract which has been breached could elect to hold the 
defaulting party to it, applied to employment contracts as well. 
This was confirmed in NUTW & OTHERS v STAG PACKINGS (PTY) LTD AND 
ANOTHER30 •
The court in STAG PACKINGS made a further ruling which was to alter 
forever our court's general acceptance of the 'rule' in Schi erhout 
that an ordinary employee's only remedy for wrongful dismissal was 
to claim damages. 
27. 1975 (4) SA 484
28. The now repealed Black Labour Relations Act No. 48 of 1953 (in
terms of S 24 (2))
29. STEWART WRIGHTSON (PTY} LTD v THORPE 1977 (2) SA 943 (A}.
30. 1982 (4) SA 151, (1982) 3 ILJ 285 AT 290G - 291A.
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In examining the scope of the remedy of specific performance, the 
court found that it had a discretion whether to grant it or not� 
and relied on the Appellate Division case of HAYNES v 
KINGWILLIAMST0WN MUNICIPALITY32 as authority for this. It pointed 
out that Haynes had made no attempt to exclude ordinary employees 
when formulating the approach to the granting of specific 
performance and concluded that the discretion in respect of the 
remedy was 'equally applicable' to such employees.33
The court went on to suggest that the personal nature of the 
contract and the absence of mutuality, which were the reasons cited 
in SCHIERH0UT for the remedy having been abandoned, were facts which 
were 'weighty indeed and in the normal case ••• might well be 
conclusive • 34 but it emphasised that they were only to be taken
into account in the exercise of discretion. They were not legal 
principles. 
31. AT 290 A
32. 1951 (2) SA 371 AT 378 AND 379. The court also referred to
DINER v DUBLIN 1962 (4) SA 36 AT 40 in terms of which a
confidential relationship had been enforced as a result of the
court finding it had a discretion to grant specific performance.
33. AT 292 D
34. AT 292 E-F
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This approach has been confirmed by the Appellate Division in BENSON 
v SA MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY35 in which the court found it
had an absolute discretion to grant specific performance and that 
this was not to be restricted by any rigid rules36 •
The employer's general aversion to reinstatement is at last 
changing. One of the main reasons for this has been the Industrial 
Court's power to grant the remedy in terms of both S43 and S46(9) of 
the Labour Relations Act. 
Prior to the amendments37 S43 enabled the court to 'cancel the
suspension or to reinstate' an employee in a dispute concerning the 
suspension or termination of his employment contract. 38 The court
was also enpowered 'to restore the labour practices' which existed 
prior to the commission of an unfair labour practice in a dispute 
concerning an unfair labour practice.39 Under S46(9) the court 
had to 'determine the unfair labour practice dispute as soon as 
35. 1986 (l) SA 776 (A)
36. See, too, RANCH INTER-PARK LINES (TVL) (PTY) LTD v L.M.G.
CONSTRUCTION CITY (PTY) LTD 1984 (3) SA 861 AT878 I - 879 I;
MULTI TUBE SYSTEMS v PONTING & OTHERS 1984 (3) SA 182 (D) AT
186; TSHABALALA & OTHERS v MIN I STER OF HEAL TH & MA YEK ISO v
MINISTER OF HEALTH & WELFARE & OTHERS (1986) 7 ILJ 227 AT 230
H - I.
37. In terms of the Labour Relations Amendment Act No. 83 of 1988
38. S43(l)(a) read with S43(4)(b)(i)
39. S43(l)(c) read with S43(4)(b)(iii)
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possible.•40
While the court's power to reinstate under S43 was express,41 
there was no similar express provision under S46(9). This gave rise 
to the argument that the legislature had thus obviously not intended 
the court to order reinstatement in determining the dispute under 
S46(9) but the argument has been rejected by the court on a number 
of occasions. 42
40. S46(9)(c). The provisions of sections 49 to 58, 62, 69 and 71
were to be applicable to any such determination. These
sections were relevant insofar as they made the determination
final and binding (S49(1)), a breach of which was a criminal
offence ( S53 (l ) ) • In terms of S49 ( 3), the determination could
also be made retrospective for six months.
41. Although the employer could avoid physical reinstatement by
electing instead simply to pay an employee his remuneration in
terms of S43(7).
42. See, for example, S.A. DIAMOND WORKERS' UNION v THE MASTER
DIAMOND CUTTERS ASSOCIATION OF S.A. (1982) 3 ILJ 87 AT lllE- H;
MAWU v FILPRO {PTY) LTD (1984) 5 ILJ 171 AT 178A-B; GUMEDE &
OTHERS v RICHDENS (PTY) LTD T/A RICHDENS FOODLINER (1984)
5 ILJ 84 AT 94A; NUTW & OTHERS v SEA GIFT SURFWARE
MANUFACTURERS {1985) 6 ILJ 391 AT 395F - 397H; SEAWUSA & OTHERS
v TRIDENT STEEL {PTY) LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 418 AT 436I - 437A AND
MAWU & OTHERS v NATAL DIE CASTING CO (PTY) LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 520
AT 545 H. See, too, the article 'Determining 11Determine 11 : The
Court's Power to Re-instate' in Employment Law Vol 3 No. 5 82.
- 121 -
The 1988 Amendments have altered the position and have placed the 
court's power to order reinstatement beyond any doubt. It is is now 
empowered in terms of S43(4)(b)(v) to 1make such order as it deems 
reasonable in the circumstances,'43 and in terms of S46(9)(c), the 
court is required to 'determine the dispute on such terms as it may 
deem reasonable, including but not limited to the ordering of re­
; nstatement or compensation 1• 44 That the Industrial Court now has 
the power to order reinstatement is beyond question. What remains 
to be seen is what the court takes into account in the exercise of 
its discretion in deciding whether or not to grant the remedy. The 
very different nature of the section 43 and section 46(9) 
applications and the difference between the farmer's status quo 
order and the latter's determination have had important effects on 
the exercise of its discretion. In exercising its discretion under 
section 43 prior of the September 1988 Amendments, the court could 
take into account any 'matters which it considered relevant. •45 
Now, in making 'such order as it deems reasonable in the 
circumstances,'46 the court is obliged to consider whether it 
would be 'expedient' to do so.47 In deciding whether or not the
43. The employer's option to pay the remuneration where 
reinstatement is ordered is retained in S43(7).
44. Section 47 has been added and section 69 has been omitted from
those sections referred to in footnote 40 above which are to be
applicable to the determination.
45. In terms of the old section 43(4)(b)
46. In terms of the new section 43(4)(b)
47. Section 43(4)(b)(v)
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granting of an order of reinstatement would be expedient, it is 
likely that the court will continue to take into account the 
relevant matters which it did in the past and in weighing their 
relevance, will still make use of the interim interdict test of the 
'balance of convenience.' The test compares the relative prejudice 
either party wi 11 suffer in the event of the relief either being 
granted or refused. The effect of this is that the employee 
generally gets the relief he is seeking at this stage as he is 
usually the party who will suffer more prejudice, all factors 
considered. 
The difference between the effect of the section 43 status quo order 
and the section 46(9) determination has also had a significant 
bearing on the court's decisions. The status quo order is only a 
temporary one48 with the employer having the added convenience of
being able to elect simply to pay the employee and still comply with 
the order. 49 In addition, the employer is provided with a further 
'safeguard against hardship 150 in that the order is made only for
limited periods, extensions of which may only be granted after the 
court has considered attempts made by the parties to settle the 
dispute.51 The determination, on the other hand, entails not only
48. Although in practice the losing party normally accepts defeat
at this stage, the 'temporary' order thus effectively having
permanent consequences.
49. In terms of section 43(7)
50. Per TH IRION J in CONSOLIDATED FRAME COTTON CORPORATION LTD v
PRESIDENT INDUSTRIAL COURT AND OTHERS (1985) 6 ILJ 7 AT 17H-I.
51. In terms of the proviso to section 43(6).
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permanent reinstatement but actual physical reinstatement52 as
well, thereby fulfilling all the requirements of the employer's 
dreaded old bogey. 
These differences between section 43 and section 46(9) in turn have 
a marked effect on the factors which the court takes into account in 
deciding whether or not to grant the relief sought. Consequently it 
often. happens that certain factors which could sway the court 
against reinstatement at the section 46(9) stage could be considered 
irrelevant in a section 43 application. It also happens that 
factual disputes, which cannot be as easily clarified at section 43 
as they can be at section 46 (9) due to the fact that the former 
application is argued on affidavit, may have a bearing on the 
court's decision. Various of the factors which the court has taken 
into account in assessing whether or not to grant reinstatement will 
now be examined. 
52. The Appellate Division, in CONSOLIDATED FRAME COTTON
CORPORATION LTD v THE PRESIDENT INDUSTRIAL COURT AND OTHERS
(1986) 7 ILJ 489, appears to accept that the natural and
ordinary meaning of 'reinstate', in respect of someone who has
been dismissed, is 'to put him back into the same job or
position which he occupied before the dismissal, on the same
terms and conditions 1 (AT 494D-E). The court further makes a
distinction between this meaning and the meaning of 'reinstate'
in section 43 (AT 495F).
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THE COURT'S DISCRETION 
The Industrial Court's discretion, though wide, both in Section 43 
and Section 46 applications, may be fettered to some extent by the 
11unfair labour practice" definition. The relevant portion of the 
definition identifies the employee's employment opportunities and 
work security,53 the unfair disruption of the employer's business 
and the harmful effect on labour unrest and on the employment 
relationship as the limits within which the discretion is to be 
exercised.54 The limits amount to a system of checks and balances
which the court weighs up before making a decision and this, 
generally speaking, it has done fairly well. 
The question of the employee I s employment opportunities and work 
security has, except in one case, 55 hardly been considered by the 
court. In a country as beset by unemployment as ours, this omission 
is astonishing to say the least. The court often takes the factor 
into account in assessing in whose favour the balance of convenience 
53. Before the 1988 Amendments, a consideration of the employee's
'physical, economic, moral or sound welfare' was also required
in terms of Clause (a}(i) of the old definition.
54. Section l (0) of the Act. See Ada A H Ver Loren Van Themaat
'Re-instatement and Security of Employment - Part One : South
Africa' (1989) 10 ILJ 205 AT 221.
55. That of SADWU v THE MASTER DIAMOND CUTTER'S ASSOCIATION OF S.A.
(1982) 3 ILJ 87. See AT 117G - ll8C
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lies in interim reinstatement applications. At the Section 46(9) 
stage however, where the factor would be thought to be of far more 
relevance, with the employee otherwise facing the bleak prospect of 
almost certain unemployment, it has not done so. 
The extent to which an order of reinstatement would unfairly affect 
the employer's business has been considered on ·several occasions, 
with varying results. 
Where a period of time has elapsed between the date of dismissal and 
the date on which the court makes its order, which is inevitably the 
case in Section 46(9) hearings, the duration of the period and the 
extent to which the enterprise has returned to normal , are factors 
taken into account by the court. In SEAWUSA and OTHERS v TRIDENT 
STEEL (PTY) LTD56 the court, in making its determination, decided
that an order of reinstatement fifteen months after the 
re-employment of the rest of the workforce would have been too 
disruptive.57 The 35 applicants were consequently awarded six 
months wages as compensation for their unfair dismissals. This 
reasoning was approved of and followed in MAWU and OTHERS v 
TRANSVAAL PRESSED NUTS, BOLTS AND RIVETS (PTY) LTD58 where the
period after the dismissals ranged from twenty to twenty-four months. 
56. (1986) 7 ILJ 418
57. AT 437 H-I
58. (1988) 9 ILJ 129 AT 144 H-145 A. See, too, the recognition
given to the disruptive potential of such an order in KHUMALO &
OTHERS v MILLBURG PAINTING CONTRACTORS (PTY) LTD (1988) 9 ILJ
338 AT 340 I.
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The effect of the section 43 order can never be as disruptive since 
it is usually made fairly soon after the dismissal, it is temporary 
in nature and it does not have to entail physical 
reinstatement. 59 This last mentioned factor has been taken into 
account in a number of cases where the court as a result exercised 
its discretion in favour of the employees.60 
It has also, rather surprisingly, been held to be too disruptive to 
reinstate employees on the ground that their positions have been 
filled. Although the court in one case criticised the employer for 
having done so, particularly when the dismissed employees' 
intentions to be reinstated were known, it nevertheless took the 
factor into account before ordering their reinstatement.61 In the 
well known case of MAWU AND OTHERS v BTR SARMCOL, 62 the employees
applying for reinstatement were not so fortunate. The court decided 
that it could not only consider the position of the dismissed 
employees. Having been given the task of maintaining good labour, 
it considered itself bound 11to have regard to the present work-force 
who stepped into the breach to save the Company from bankruptcy some 
59. In terms of Section 43(7)
60. See, for example, MAWU v HENDLER AND HENDLER (1985) ILJ 362 AT
368 E-F; ROBBERTZE v MATTHEW RUSTENBURG REFINERIES (WADEVILLE}
(1986} 7 ILJ 64 AT 71B-G AND BASODTWU v HOMEGAS (1986) 7 ILJ
411 AT 417 D-F.
61. MAINE v AFRICAN CABLES (1985) 6 ILJ 234 AT 245 C-F
62. (1987)8 ILJ 815
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of them suffering great personal loss in the process.1163 The 
court went on to find that reinstatement would not be fair as it 
would have the effect of "ousting" people who were "i nnocent 1164 to
the dispute notwithstanding the fact that most of those ousted by 
the Company had been employed on average for seventeen years.65 
The argument that the effect of the order would seriously disrupt 
the employer I s economic viability, has had mixed success. The 
Appell ate Division, in CONSOLIDATED FRAME COTTON CORPORATION LTD v 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT66 recognised that the
Industrial Court had the power to make orders which may indeed have 
such far-reaching consequences but went on to presume that the 
legislature must have intended the power to be exercised 'reasonably 
and equitably, and with due regard to the interests not only of 
employees but also of the employers 167• It has been seen how the
weight given to the argument by the court has been largely dependent 
upon whether the finding was a status quo order or a determination. 
In the former instance the argument has had little sway, with the 
court in one case granting the order even though the respondent 
company had already been liquidated.68 Similarly, in BASODTWU AND 
63. AT 839 F-G
64. AT 839 G-H
65. See AT 818 I-J
66. (1986 ) 7 ILJ 489
67. AT 495 D-E
68. MAWU v G & H ERECTORS (1985) ICD (1) 28 AT 29.
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ANOTHER V HOMEGAs,69 the contention that an order would so
seriously affect the respondent's business that it would probably 
have had to close down one of its operations would, the court held, 
have been an important factor in respect of a determination but not 
in respect of a status quo order. 70 In SAAWU & OTHERS v DORBYL
AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS (PTY} LTD71 however, where a similar 
contention was raised, the court questioned why the same approach as 
that adopted in the HOMEGAS case should not al so apply to section 
46(9} proceedings,72 and in its determination reinstated the
employees. 
69. (1986) 7 ILJ 411 AT 417 D-F.
70. Contrast this with G.W.U. & OTHERS v AFRICAN SPUN CONCRETE CO.
(PTY} LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 35 AT 39 A-B, where the court in
deciding against reinstatement, took into account and accepted
the respondent company's contention that a reinstatement order
could financially cripple it, even though it was only a status
quo order.
71. (1988) 9 ILJ 680 AT 689 B.
72. AT 689 B. See, too, KOMPECHA v BITE MY SAUSAGE. C.C. (1988) 9
ILJ 1077 AT 1083 G-1084 D and FAWU v OTHERS v AMEEN$ FOOD
PRODUCTS & BUTCHERY (1988) 9 ILJ 659 AT 671 F-G where the court
did not accept the employer's alleged inability to afford to
reinstate employees and 
reinstatement under S 46 (9).
consequently ordered their
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Another factor taken into account by the court as having a possible 
disruptive effect is whether or not an order of reinstatement would 
undermine management authority. In FIHLA & OTHERS v PEST CONTROL 
TVL (PTY) Lrn,73 the court said "There is much more at stake for 
an employer than his ability to pay the wages. A reinstatement 
order, even if only of temporary nature, is a serious invasion of 
the managerial perogative of an employer, and could undermine his 
authority and frustrate enforcement of discipline.1174 But in 
NODLELE v MOUNT NELSON HOTEL 1175 in response to the employer's
argument that reinstatement could persuade the· applicant's fellow 
waiters that they would get away with poor service in future, the 
court realistically held that it could not accept that its judgement 
would be regarded as a licence to disobey the hotel's work 
procedures.76 
A further factor taken into account by the court is what effect an 
order of reinstatement would have on labour unrest. Since one of 
the most important objectives of the Labour Relations Act is to 
reduce strife in the workplace, it would be expected that the factor 
would be an important one. Before the court is swayed by the 
argument however, it must be satisfied that there is a very real 
prospect that reinstatement would lead to unrest. Where this would 
not be the case, in Section 43 orders for example where the employer 
73. (1984) 5 ILJ 165
74. AT 169
75. (1984) 5 ILJ 216
76. AT 226 H-I. See, too, NGOBENI & OTHERS v VETSAK (CO-OP) LTD
(1984) 5 ILJ 205 AT 214 F-G, where the argument also failed to
impress the court.
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is not obliged to reinstate the employee physically, the court has 
been qui ck to refer the emp 1 oyer to such right in granting the 
order. 77 
The court has even in one case been reluctant to accept the argument 
where the reinstatement would be physical. In NTULI & OTHERS v 
LITEMASTER PRODUCTS LTD78, where the employer had argued that
reinstatement would have the effect of making labour relations in 
the factory untenable and would jeopardise his financial viability, 
the court held that it was, 
11 
•••• not a principle of our law that a court should deny 
relief to a litigant who is entitled to such relief, purely 
upon the ground that it may or will cause embarrassment, or 
financial or economic hardship to the opposite party.1179
Allied to this factor is another which the court considers in its 
discretion and that is whether or not an order of reinstatement 
could have the effect of making the parties more amenable to 
conciliation. Settling disputes is, of course, another of the Act's 
77. See, for example, ROBBERTZE v MATTHEW RUSTENBURG REFINERIES 
(WADEVILLE) (1986) 7 ILJ 64 AT 718, where fears that 
reinstatement would spark off industrial action, and MAWU & 
ANOTHER v HENDLER & HENDLER (PTY} LTD (1985) 6 ILJ 362 AT 368E, 
where alleged intimidation and threats by the rival union did 
not preclude the court from granting the orders. 
78. (1985) 6 ILJ 508
79. AT 5l 9E
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objectives and where there is any likelihood that an order could 
have this effect, the court rules accordingly. In GOVENDER v 
KAISER-KRONE80, despite an alleged breakdown between the app 1 i cant
and the respondent I s di rector, the court neverthe 1 ess found that 
there were, 
" •••• prospects of conciliation in the sense of a settlement of 
the dispute on a businesslike basis, reached after honest, if 
hard negotiation, on terms acceptable to both parties which 
need have no effect at all on other aspects of their past or 
future relationship."81 
What effect reinstatement would have on the employment relationship 
is still one of the most important factors taken into account. Due 
to the differences of the effect of the court's order under section 
43 and its determination under section 46(9), the factor does not 
weigh as heavily on the court in cases brought under the former 
section. 
The factor is, of course, the same as that which was most often 
advanced by our ordinary courts when they decided against ordering 
specific performance of employment contracts. The difference, 
however, is that the Industrial Court does not merely accept it as a 
foregone conclusion that reinstatement would detrimentally affect 
every employment relationship and the court generally examines the 
circumstances of each case in deciding whether or not reinstatement 
would be appropriate. 
80. (1987) I.C.D. (1) 347
81. AT 349. See, too, MDLALOSE v I E LAHER & SONS (PTY) LTD (1985)
6 ILJ 350 AT 360C and FAWU & OTHERS v AMEENS FOOD PRODUCTS &
BUTCHERY (1988) 9 ILJ 659 AT 671 F-G
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In doing so, the court considers a number of facts. The degree of 
acrimony between the parties, the level of the employee, the size of 
the undertaking and the nature of the offence are all relevant 
considerations. Where senior employees are concerned, the degree of 
acrimony between the parties is often a decisive factor. The court 
appears to recognise that respect, trust and understanding are 
usually as vital to a good working relationship at this level as 
they are to any other close relationship and it has appreciated that 
it cannot order senior employees to work together where there would 
be a lack of trust and harmony.82 The court is cautious however 
and must be con vi need that there is i ncompati bi l i ty between the 
parties before it refuses to grant reinstatement for this reason.83 
82. See STEVENSON v STERNS JEWELLERS (PTY} LTD {1986} 7 ILJ 318 AT
325 C - E. The applicant in this case had been appointed as
the Managing Director of the Respondent for a period of three
weeks at the time of his dismissal. See too CLARKE v NINIAN
AND LESTER { PTY} LTD {1988} 9 I LJ 651 AT 658 E - F where the
court decided that an order of compensation was more
appropriate due to the friction which had arisen between the
parties after the dismissal. Compare this to the case of
MAFALALA v DERBERS {PTY} LTD {1987} !CD {l} 627 in which the
applicant, a fabric presser, had been employed for seventeen
years. From this the court drew the conclusion that the level
of acrimony, if there was any at all, was not likely to prevent
a good working relationship from being re-established {AT 629).
83. See, for example LARCOMBE v NATAL NYLON INDUSTRIES (PTY) LTD
(1986) 7 ILJ 326.
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The existence of acrimony between the parties would not be as 
significant where the applicant was a low-level employee or where 
the enterprise was 1 arge enough to ensure that he would not come 
into contact with those with whom conflict was likely.84 
The position is different where the business is a small concern 
where close contact is inevitable. Where the application is brought 
under section 43, this factor is normally considered to be 
irrelevant,85 but where the matter is before the court under 
section 46(9), the consideration is often a vital one. Thus, in 
CCAWUSA AND ANOTHER v WOOL TRU LTD T / A WOOLWORTHS, 86 even though 
the dismissal was seen as substantively unfair, the employee was 
refused reinstatement. The reason for this, the court held, was due 
to the fact that the acrimonious parties would have to work in close 
contact and this would lead to tension in the workplace. The court 
84. Although see BCAWU AND ANOTHER v WEST RAND BRICK WORKS (1984) 5
ILJ 69 AT 81 I - 82 D.
85. See BASODTWU AND ANOTHER v HOMEGAS (PTY) LTD {1986) 7 ILJ 411
AT 417 F - G. See too GOVENDER v KAISER-KRONE (1987) ICD (1)
347 AT 349 where the court did not consider that the employer
would even have to resort to section 43(7) due to the
'separateness' of the two working areas concerned.
86. (1989) 10 ILJ 311 AT 319 D - G. See, too, KOMPECHA v BITE MY
SAUSAGE C.C. {1988) 9 ILJ 1077 AT 1083 D - G where the court,
in deciding the nature of relief to be afforded, took into
account the fact that the employer I s business only had five
employees who had to work closely together. The court al so
found that the employer-employee relationship had been badly
affected by the whole incident and this ruled out reinstatement
as a remedy.
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has also decided against reinstatement where there has been a 
history of instructions being ignored and of other ill-disciplined 
action. 87 
A factor i ntri nsi c to the effect reinstatement may have on the 
employment rel ati onshi p is the nature of the offence. In the same 
way that the consideration may affect the fairness of the dismissal 
itself, so too is it taken into account in determining how 
appropriate the remedy of reinstatement would be. The court has 
accordingly held, in a case involving fraud, that the employers' 
loss of trust in the employee had possibly led to an irretrievable 
breakdown of the relationship and this made the remedy of 
reinstatement inappropriate in the circumstances.88 
Now that the Industrial Court undoubtedly has the power to order 
reinstatement, there has regrettably been a disturbing trend 
recently for awards of compensation to be ordered instead. Such 
awards are in some cases obviously more appropriate89 and in
87. See SACWU AND OTHERS v C.E. INDUSTRIAL (PTY) LTD T/A PANVET
(1988) 9 ILJ 639 AT 650 F - H.
88. HLALUTYANA v NABE BAZAAR (1987) ICD (1) 351 AT 352.
89 . The legislature of course recognised that there was a place for 
awards of compensation and made express provision for them in 
both S43 and S46(9). Where the employee, for example, makes it 
clear that reinstatement is not being sought, it would be 
absurd to make such an order. The use of an award of this 
nature was also approved of by the International Labour 
Organisation in paragraph 2(6) of Recommendation No. 119 of 
1963 which did stipulate though that the compensation had to be 
"adequate". 
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others are made only after the court has exercised its discretion 
and has seriously considered some of the above-mentioned factors in 
deciding against reinstatement. There· have been instances however, 
where the rejection by the court of reinstatement as a remedy has 
been inexplicable. Examples of this failure shall be dealt with 
below. 
In discussing the appropriateness 
draw a di sti ncti on between cases 
procedurally unfair and those 
substantively unfair. 
of the remedy, it is necessary to 
where the employer has only been 
in which he has also been 
The court in NAAWU v PRETORIA PRECISION CASTINGS 90 failed to draw 
this distinction and accordingly ended up making a rather extreme 
and unfair finding. Notwithstanding the fact that there was no 
doubt whatsoever about the substantive fairness of the 
dismissa1,91 the employee was permanently reinstated as a result 
of the employer's failure to hold a hearing. In a criticism of the 
decision, Brassey92 correctly, it is submitted, points out that 
the court erred, inter alia, in regarding reinstatement as the 
'automatic consequence' of procedural unfairness. Clearly, an award 
of compensation would have been more appropriate in the 
circumstances or, as Brassey suggests,93 the court could have made
90. (1985) 6 ILJ 369.
91. The presiding officer having been 'satisfied that • • • • (the 
employer) was entitled to dismiss his employee.' {at 3760-E). 
92. Brassey et al The New Labour Law (Juta & Co, 1987) 87-88.
93. Ibid at 88.
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the reinstatement last until the employee had been heard.94 
The court has, however, generally recognised the differing effects 
which procedural and substantive unfairness should have on the type 
of order to be made and where it is satisfied that a dismissal is 
substantively fair it has normally granted compensation as a more 
appropriate remedy.95 What is to be emphasised is that the court 
94. This would have rectified the presiding officer's valid concern
about the need to di sti ngui sh between guilt and sanction in
hearings (at 379 H). See, for example, MAWU & OTHERS v
FERALLOYS (1987) 8 ILJ 124 where the court appreciated that its
reinstatement order would not deprive the employer of the right
to dismiss in the event of evidence of the alleged offence
being obtained. Contrast the curious order made by the court
in MAWU & OTHERS v SIEMENS LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 547 in which the
court merely directed the employer to hold an enquiry to remedy
the unfair labour practice resulting from its failure to do so
initially. At the same time, however, the applicants were not
reinstated.
95. See, for example, EAWU v REYROLLE PARSONS OF SA (1986) 7 ILJ
509; CCAWUSA & OTHERS v RONDALIA VAKANSIE-OORDE BPK T/A
BUFFELSPOORT VAKANSIE-OORD (1988) 9 ILJ 871; TGWU & ANOTHER v
INTERSTATE BUS LINES (PTY) LTD (1988) 9 ILJ 877 and KOMPECHA v
BITE MY SAUSAGE C.C. (1988) 9 ILJ 1077. Private arbitrators in
South Africa have apparently also endorsed the principle that
procedural unfairness is more appropriately remedied by
compensation. See C O'Regan 'The Development of Private Labour
Arbitration in South Africa - A Review of the Arbitration
Awards' (1989) 10 ILJ 557 AT 571. What remains to be said is
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must be sa�isfied with the merits of the employer's case before it 
can reject the use of reinstatement as the remedy. There are, of 
course, occasions where it is not possible to decide on substantive 
fairness due to the procedural lapse96 and if this is the case,
compensation is clearly not appropriate. In such circumstances, 
reinstatement is the better remedy, even if it does last only so 
long as the substantive fairness takes to be established. It may 
after all so happen that in rectifying the lapse, the employer could 
come to realise that the dismissal was not substantively fair in 
which event the employee would of course retain his job. 
95. (contd) that the awards made by the court would scarcely act as
deterrents to unscrupulous employers. In the above cases, they
ranged from one week to four weeks which would hardly meet the
I.L.O. 1 s recommendation that compensation should be "adequate".
96. However, see ROSTOLL EN I N ANDER v LEEUPOORT MINERALE BRON
(1 987) 8 ILJ 366 where the court after rejecting the approach
used in the English case of BRITISH LABOUR PUMP CO v BYRNE
(1 979) IRLR 94 (EAT), proceeded to apply it to overcome the
obstacle of uncertainty on the merits. Having satisfied itself
that the reasonable employer would have dismissed the
applicant, the court refused to order even temporary
reinstatement and the employee went away with nothing in the
face of glaring procedural {and possibly even substantive)
unfairness.
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While it is generally accepted, then, that procedural unfairness 
should not as a matter of course be remedied by means of 
reinstatement, there have recently . been a number of instances in 
which the court has rejected the remedy even though it has been 
satified that the dismissal was substantively unfair as well. In 
doing so, the court has in some cases not even justified its refusal 
on the basis of its discretionary powers and the reasoning behind 
the denial of reinstatement has been very dubious. 
In ACTWUSA & OTHERS v AFRICAN HIDE TRADING CORPORATION (PTY) 
LTD,97 for example, the court found that the dismissals were
substantively unfair and that the sanction of dismissal had been 
wrong98 but it neverthe 1 ess refused to reinstate the app 1 i cants.
The reason for this, it said, was because the 'applicants had 
scraped home virtually by the skin of their teeth as to substantive 
fairness. 1 99 The court's reasoning is clearly faulty particularly
in view of the it's earlier insistence that the dismissals were 
substantively unfair and that dismissal was the wrong penalty. 
97. (1989 ) 10 ILJ 475
98 . AT 479 H-I. The court rather surprisingly also found that 
although the enquiries were fair, the dismissals were also 
procedurally unfair in that the sanction applied was wrong! 
99. AT 479J
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Where the court went wrong, it is submitted, was in introducing the 
degree of substantive fairness into the question of deciding on the 
appropriate remedy. There are always, of course, degrees of 
fairness and fairness is itself a relative concept but such degrees 
weigh upon the substantive fairness or otherwise of the dismissal. 
They should never be taken into account in deciding what remedy 
should be adopted. 
In considering what the appropriate remedy should be, the court also 
took into account the fact that the dismissals had been the result 
of a 'political' stay-away. This, it seems, was the real reason for 
the court's reluctance to grant the remedy of reinstatement, for it 
had emphasised that it could not condone such action which it saw as 
serving 'no •••• purpose, apart from disrupting the country's 
economy and causing employers irreparable financial loss' •100 The
reasoning is again bad as this is a factor which impacts not on what 
remedy should be granted but on the question of substantive fairness 
itself. As we have seen, the court had had no hesitation in finding 
that the dismissals were substantively unfair. It is indeed 
unfortunate and distressing that the court itself should have 
adopted such a political stance so weighted in favour of employers, 
particularly at this point in time when its credibility with Unions 
is already tenuous. 
100. AT 478 J - 479 A. Contrast this with the fairer and far more
realistic approach adopted in BASODTWU & ANOTHER v HOMEGAS
(PTY) LTD (1986} 7 ILJ 411 and SALDCDAWU & OTHERS v ADVANCE
LAUNDRIES T/A STORK NAPKINS (1985) 6 ILJ 544 (the cases are
dea 1 t with under the heading I Absence from Work I in Chapter 5
above.
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In SACWU & OTHERS V TOILETPAK MANUFACTURERS (PTY) LTD & OTHERs101
the court's denial of reinstatement was even worse. It again made 
no attempt to justify its refusal in terms of its exercise of 
discretion and it provided no reason for not reinstating the 
employee. Instead, it simply decided against reinstatement and 
found that compensation would be more 'feasible and 
• t I 102 appropr1a e • 
Although it did say that it had reached this decision 'after having 
regard to the circumstances of the case, 1103 this merely serves to 
aggravate the matter for the case involved such gross unfairness 
that one can only conclude that the court could not have had very 
serious regard to the circumstances. 
The case involved the transfer of business from one company to 
another as a result of industrial unrest caused by retrenchments. 
The remaining employees' services were dispensed with on the closure 
of the former company and this was followed by the selective 
re-employment of some of them. 
The court found that the retrenchments had been unfair and it saw 
the transfer of the business as a ruse by the employer to get rid of 
his employees. Even where a transfer was genuine, the court said it 
would expect the employer to 'consider the interests of the 
workforce as human beings who have families to support•.104 The 
101. (1 988) 9 ILJ 295
102. AT 307 H - I
l 03. IBID
104. AT 305 G-H
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resultant termination of their employment could not be justified on 
the basis of retrenchment since none of the guidelines had been 
followed105 and nor could it be justified on the basis of
dismissal for misconduct since there was no evidence of this. 106 
The court also found that the employer had further compounded the 
issue by selectively re-employing several employees. The employer, 
it can be said, could not have acted more unfairly if he had tried. 
Despite these being the circumstances of the case however, the court 
nevertheless felt that a monetary determination would be more 
appropriate. Almost aggravating the unfairness suffered by the 
employees it awarded them pal try sums ranging between R220 and 
R580. 107 Unscrupulous labour practices, it seems, have never come 
cheaper. 
105. AT 305 A-8
106. AT 306 0-E
107. Had the individual applicants' applications not been financed
by their Union, the amounts awarded would undoubtedly not even
have covered their legal costs. They would have been not only
unemployed but out of pocket as well and this in a case where
the employer had by all accounts been grossly unfair.
- 142 -
In another case in which the dismissals were found to have been both 
procedurally and substantively unfair, the court refused 
reinstatement after a questionable exercise of its discretion. In 
SACWU & OTHERS v C.E. INDUSTRIAL (PTY) LTD T/A PANVET,108 the 
remedy was denied due to a 1 deliberate ignoring of instructions and 
other ill-disciplined actions•109 on the part of the individual 
applicants. Such behaviour, it is submitted, should have been the 
subject of disciplinary enquiries at the time which could have 
focused on the individuals .responsible for the alleged offences. 
They then would have been disciplined accordingly, had the breaches 
been established. But for the court to take them into account as a 
factor justifying the refusal of reinstatement to all employees was 
clearly unsatisfactory. The court also took an impending 
retrenchment into account as a factor which it felt, would not make 
reinstatement 'fair to the employer.•110 
The award made by the court in this case was again negligible, with 
employees being given the equivalent of ten week's wages. Ver Loren 
Van Themaat sugges_ts that even the six month retrospective award 
provided for in the Act111 bears 'no proportionality to the loss
which a worker experiences when he is unjustly deprived of his 
108. (1988) 9 ILJ 639
l 09. AT 650 F-G
110 AT 650 G-H 
111. In terms of S49 (3) (b).
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employment.1112 He goes on to argue that the wording in the
relevant provisions should be interpreted to limit the award to six 
months only retrospectively. It places no limit on the award's 
future validity and such an unrestricted order, he says, would be 
more appropriate. 
It is however unlikely that the court would ever make such an 
order113 which would not in any event be as preferable as an order
of reinstatement. In cases involving substantive unfairness, the 
court should be very wary of granting compensation and should 
instead, wherever possible, award reinstatement. Where it cannot do 
so and where there are good reasons for rejecting the award, these 
must be spelt out by the court. 
Reinstatement is, after all, the best way to rectify the devastating 
consequences of unfair di smi ssa l • It has been recognised in a 
general survey by the I.L.O.'s Committee of Experts114 to be the 
most effective way to protect job security and, where alternative 
employment is scarce, it is seen to be the 'only truly satisfactory 
means of redress.1115
112. Ada A H Ver Loren Van Themaat 'Reinstatement and Security of
Employment - Part One: South Africa• (1989) 10 ILJ 205 AT 225.
113. See the views expressed by the Industrial Court in SEAWUSA v
TRIDENT STEEL (PTY) LTD (1986) 7 ILJ 418 AT 438A and by the
Supreme Court when the matter was taken on review in TRIDENT
STEEL (PTY) LTD v JOHN NO (1987) 8 ILJ 27 (T) AT 33B. Both
cases are cited by Ver Loren Themaat, ibid.
114. See E Verni n 'Job Security : Influence of ILO Standards and
Recent Trends 1 International Labour Review, Vol 113, No. l,
January-February 1976, 17 AT 28.
115. By Yemin, ibid. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have looked at the position in South Africa prior to the 
introduction of the concept of unfair dismissal and we have seen 
what inadequate protection employees were afforded when their 
contracts were terminated. The most the employer was obliged to do 
in order to terminate the employment was to give the employee notice 
in terms of the contract. This notice ranged between one week to a 
month but could have been as little as one day. Where the employee 
was guilty of a breach of the contract, he could be dismissed 
iITlllediately and the employer would not be obliged to comply with the 
notice provision. Where the employee could prove that he had not 
breached the contract and that his dismissal had been wrongful, his 
only remedy was a claim for damages. 
The decision to dismiss was in all cases the employer's and there 
was seldom any question, other than in a few statutorily defined 
situations, of taking the employee's version of events into 
account. So, whether the emp 1 oyee was dismissed summarily, given 
notice or successful in a claim for damages, he obviously had very 
1 i ttl e protection for the 1 oss of a job which could have provided 
income for a lifetime. We saw, as a consequence, that there was a 
growing appreciation and acceptance of the importance of job 
security. 
We then looked at how this led to the idea that an employee should 
not be dismissed unless there was a good reason for the di smi ssa l 
and we saw that it was up to the employer to justify this by 
showing that he had acted fairly. The concept of fairness is 
obviously extremely wide and at times it is almost nebulous. But it 
does have limits and it is made more definite as a yardstick in the 
sphere of dismissal by being broken down into procedural and 
substantive aspects. 
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We have seen that procedural fairness basically requires that an 
employee is given a fair hearing, that he is warned where the breach 
is not so gross that it justifies dismissal and that he has the 
right to appeal against his dismissal if he so wishes. We looked at 
substantive fairness and saw that in the view of the Industrial 
Court, various acts of misconduct, incapacity as a result of ill 
health, incompetence and incompatability could under certain 
circumstances constitute fair and valid reasons for dismissal. The 
Industrial Court has, it can be said, developed some quite 
consistent guidelines in this regard and has managed to define, as 
far as this is possible, fairly well what it considers to be 
substantively fair in respect of the termination of employment. 
This then brought us to the point where we could examine the use of 
the remedy of reinstatement. We found that it was a vital factor in 
the whole concept of unfair dismissal and one which gave real 
meaning to the protection of job security. Without it, the 
requirements of procedural and substantive fairness become 
meaningless •. We have seen that although there was originally 
confusion in the minds of some as to whether the Legislature ever 
intended the court to have the power to order permanent and physical 
reinstatement, there is now no longer any doubt about this. The 
Court has regrettably not always exercised this power as it could 
have done. 
Where there is procedural unfairness, the court has, correctly it is 
submitted, tended to recognise that reinstatement may not always be 
an appropriate remedy. But where a dismissal is substantively 
unfair, the granting of the remedy in almost all cases should be 
unquestioned. Where the reinstatement is not physical and is 
ordered in terms of the status quo provisions of the Labour 
Relations Act, there has been little hesitation on the part of the 
court to make the order. But where the reinstatement is physical , 
with an employee having to be thrust onto an unwilling employer, the 
court has at times shown a reluctance to make the order. While it 
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is appreciated that the court has a discretion and that 
reinstatement cannot be granted in each and every case in which 
there has been substantive unfairness, it is submitted that the 
remedy should only be refused where there are extremely good reasons 
for such refusal. Naturally the importance of job security has to 
be weighed against the employer 1 s interests and there will be cases 
in which these interests will make it difficult for the court to 
grant reinstatement, but it will always be essential for the court 
to explain and motivate exactly why it is rejecting the remedy. 
The court must be mindful of the fact that one of the purposes of 
its creation was to minimise industrial conflict. One of the ways 
it was empowered to do this was by being granted the authority to 
order reinstatement. If it fails to exercise this power without 
good reason, it will very soon cause employees and their unions to 
lose confidence in the court. It will create a perception on the 
part of employees that the presiding officers of the court are 
refusing to grant reinstatement in order to appease employers who 
have never really accepted the remedy. It wi 11 al so demonstrate 
that the true worth and importance of job security has not yet been 
fully grasped by the court 1 s officers, most of whom are white and 
have no idea of what it means to lose a job in this country. 
It is essential that the court develops to the stage where it 
realises that job security in South Africa is a highly political 
issue and one which indeed makes reinstatement the 1 only truly 
satisfactory• remedy where dismissals are substantively unfair. 
Until the court comes to this realisation, its credibility will be 
threatened and this will help to increase, rather than minimise, 
industrial conflict. 
APPENDIX I 
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DEFINITION OF 'UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE' 
'Unfair labour practice' means any act or omission which in an 
unfair manner infringes or impairs the labour relations between an 
employer and employee, and shall include the following: 
a) The dismissal, by reason of any disciplinary action against one
or more employees, without a valid and fair reason and not in
compliance with a fair procedure : Provided that the following
shall not be regarded as an unfair lab6ur practice, namely :
i) the dismissal of an employee during the first six months
of his employment with a particular employer or during
such shorter period as may have been agreed upon :
Provided that such dismissal does not take place without
compliance with a fair procedure;
ii) the dismissal of an employee where an employer fails to
hold a hearing or a disciplinary enquiry and the
industrial court thereafter decides that it could not
reasonably have been expected of an employer to hold such
a hearing or enquiry;
iii) the dismissal of an employee where an employer fails to
hold a hearing or a disciplinary enquiry and the
industrial court thereafter decides that such employee
was granted a fair opportunity to state his case and a
hearing or enquiry would in the opinion of the court not
have had a different effect on the dismissal;
iv) any dismissal which takes place after substantial
compliance with the terms and conditions of an agreement
relevant to the dismissal; or
v) the selective re-employment of dismissed employees
providing such re-employment takes place in accordance
with fair criteria and not on the ground of an employee's
trade union activities;
b) The termination of the employment of an employee on grounds
other than disciplinary action, unless -
i ) such termination of employment takes p 1 ace during the
first six months of such employee's employment with a
particular employer or during such period as may have
been agreed upon; and in accordance with any applicable
agreement, wage regulating measure or contract of
service; or
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ii) ( aa) prior notice of such termination of employment in
accordance with any applicable agreement, wage 
regulating measure or contract of service, has been 
given either to the employee, or if such employee is 
represented by a trade union or body which is 
recognized by the employer as representing the 
employees or any group of them, to such trade union, 
body or group; and 
(bb) prior consultation in regard to such termination of 
employment took place with either such employee or 
where the employee is represented by a trade union or 
body recognised by the employer as representing the 
employees or any group of them with such trade union, 
body or group; and 
(cc) such termination of employment takes place in
compliance with the terms of agreement or contract of
service, regulating the termination of employment of
the employee whose employment is terminated; and
(dd) such termination of employment takes place in a case
where the number of employees in the employment of an
employer is to be reduced, according to reasonable
criteria with regard to the selection of such
employees, including, but not limited to, the
ability, capacity, productivity and conduct of those
employees and the operational requirements and needs
of the undertaking, industry, trade or occupation of
the employer;
c) the unfair unilateral suspension of an employee or employees;
d) the unfair unilateral amendment of the terms of employment of
an employee or employees, except to give effect to any relevant
law or wage regulating measure;
e) the use of unconstitutional, misleading or unfair methods of
recruiting members by any trade union, employers• organisation,
federation, member, office-bearer or official of any trade
union, employers• organisation or federation : Provided that
the refusal of a trade union in accordance with the provisions
of such trade union 1 s constitution to admit an employee as a
member, shall not constitute an unfair labour practice;
f) the refusal or failure by any trade union, employers•
organisation, federation, member, office-bearer or official of
any trade union, employers• organisation or federation to
comply with any provision of this Act;
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g) any act whereby an employee or employer is intimidated to agree
or not to agree to any action which affects the relationship
between an employer and employee;
h) the incitement to, support of, participation in or furtherance
of any boycott of any product or service by any trade union,
federation, office-bearer or official of such trade union or
federation;
i) the unfair discrimination by any employer against any employee
solely on the grounds of race, sex or creed : Provided that any
action in compliance with any law or wage regulating measure
shall not be regarded as an unfair labour practice;
j) subject to the provisions of this Act, the direct or indirect
interference with the right of employees to associate or not to
associate, by any other employee, any trade union, employer,
employers' organisation, federation or members, office-bearers
or officials of that trade union, employer, employers'
organisation or federation, including, but not limited to, the
prevention of an employer by a trade union, a trade union
federation, office-bearers or members of those bodies to liaise
or negotiate with employees employed by the employer who are
not represented by such trade union or federation;
k) the failure or refusal by an employer, employee, trade union or
employers' organisation, to comply with an agreement;
l) any strike, lock-out or stoppage of work, if the employer is
not directly involved in the dispute which gives rise to the
strike, lock-out or stoppage of work;
m) any strike, lockout or stoppage of work in respect of a dispute
between an employer and employee which dispute is the same or
virtually the same as a dispute between such employer and
employee which gave rise to a strike, lock-out or stoppage of
work during the previous 12 months;
n) any strike, lock-out or stoppage of work in contravention of
section 65;
o) any other labour practice or change in any labour practice
which has or may have the effect that -
i) any employee's or class of employees' employment
opportunities or work security is or may be unfairly
prejudiced or unfairly jeopardized thereby;
ii) the business of any employer or class of employer is or
may unfairly be affected or disrupted thereby;
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iii) labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby;
iv) the relationship between employer and employee is or may
be detrimentally affected;
v) any employee is dismissed or otherwise unfairly
prejudiced in his conditions of service by an employer
solely or principally on the grounds of any compulsory
service or training performed or undergone or to be
performed or undergone by such employee in terms of the
Defence Act, 1957 (Act No 44 of 1957).
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